MCFADDEN, P. J., BRANCH and BETHEL, JJ.
McFadden, Presiding Judge.
quiet title action, petitioner Muriel Montia appeals from two
orders: the trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim filed by respondents Ocwen Loan
Servicing, LLC ("Ocwen") and HSBC Bank USA National
Association as Trustee for Ace Securities Corp. Home Equity
Loan Trust Series 2003-OP1 ("HSBC"), and the trial
court's grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings
and for summary judgment filed by respondent First-Citizens
Bank & Trust Company ("First-Citizens"). In
several enumerations, Montia argues that the trial court
erred in granting these motions rather than submitting the
case to a special master. We find, however, that the trial
court was authorized to dismiss the petition for failure to
state a claim and to grant judgment on the pleadings without
submitting the case to a special master, so we affirm. Given
this disposition, the issue of summary judgment is moot.
White v. Lumpkin, 272 Ga. 398 (529 S.E.2d 879)
action involves real property acquired by Montia in 2003. The
property is subject to two recorded deeds to secure debt. One
deed to secure debt is in favor of an entity that later
assigned the deed to HSBC. HSBC used Ocwen, a loan servicing
company, to try to collect that debt from Montia. The second
deed to secure debt is in favor of an entity that later went
into receivership; its receiver subsequently assigned the
deed to Capitol City Bank & Trust, a division of and
assumed name used by First-Citizens.
filed a petition to quiet title against all the world under
OCGA §§ 23-3-60 et seq. of Georgia's Quiet
Title Act. She alleged in her petition that First-Citizens,
Ocwen, and HSBC had claims adverse to her interest in the
property that were without legal basis and constituted clouds
on her title. She also asked that the case be submitted to a
special master pursuant to OCGA § 23-3-63.
herself arranged for service of process upon the respondents,
although generally the Quiet Title Act requires that service
be made by a special master. OCGA § 23-3-65 (b);
Woodruff v. Morgan County, 284 Ga. 651, 651-652 (1)
(670 S.E.2d 415) (2008). Because "a special master was
never appointed such that service could be properly completed
pursuant to the Quiet Title Act[, ] the [respondents] were
not required to answer [Montia's petition.]"
Woodruff, 284 Ga. at 652 (1). Nevertheless, Ocwen,
HSBC, and First-Citizens answered the petition and filed
their motions. Ocwen and HSBC filed a joint motion to dismiss
the petition for failure to state a claim. First-Citizens
filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, basing that
request on the petition, the answer, and the documents
attached to those pleadings. (In its motion, First-Citizens
also sought summary judgment based on evidence outside the
pleadings.) The trial court granted the motions without
submitting the case to a special master.
motion to dismiss and the motion for judgment on the
pleadings presented the trial court with the same question:
would Montia be entitled to relief under any state of facts
that she could prove in support of her claim? Where, as here,
the party moving for judgment on the pleadings does not
introduce affidavits,  depositions, or interrogatories in support
of his motion, such motion is the equivalent of a motion to
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. The motion to dismiss should not be
granted unless the averments in the complaint disclose with
certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief
under any state of facts which could be proved in support of
his [or her] claim.
Cox v. Turner, 268 Ga.App. 305 (1) (601 S.E.2d 728)
(2004) (citation omitted). When ruling on a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim or a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, a trial court may consider exhibits attached to
and incorporated into the complaint and answer. See OCGA
§ 9-11-10 (c); Trop, Inc. v. City of
Brookhaven, 296 Ga. 85, 89 (2) (764 S.E.2d 398) (2014);
Shelnutt v. Mayor and Aldermen of the City of
Savannah, 333 Ga.App. 446 (776 S.E.2d 650) (2015). We
review the trial court's rulings on these motions de
novo. Southwest Health & Wellness, LLC v. Work,
282 Ga.App. 619, 623 (2) (639 S.E.2d 570) (2006).
§ 23-3-62 sets forth the statutory requirements of a
petition to quiet title against all the world under OCGA
§§ 23-3-60 et seq. A petition that, on its face,
appears to be in noncompliance with OCGA § 23-3-62 is
subject to dismissal because, "[i]n that case, no
evidence which might be introduced within the framework of
the [petition] could sustain a grant of relief."
GHG, Inc. v. Bryan, 275 Ga.App. 336 (1) (566 S.E.2d
662) (2002) (citation and punctuation omitted). A petition
must contain, among other things, a "specification of
the petitioner's interest in the land[.]" OCGA
§ 23-3-6s (b). The petitioner "must assert that
[s]he holds some current record title or current prescriptive
title, in order to maintain h[er] suit." Smith v.
Georgia Kaolin Co., 269 Ga. 475, 477 (2) (498 S.E.2d
266) (1998) (citation, punctuation, and emphasis omitted).
The "plaintiff's right to recovery or relief depends
upon the strength of h[er] own title to the realty involved,
not the weakness of h[er] opponents' evidence."
Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).
referenced in and attached to the petition and answers in
this case show that Montia was the grantor of two deeds to
secure debt on the property. In her petition, Montia asserted
that she held title to the property by virtue of a recorded
warranty deed that she attached to her petition. But she also
acknowledged the existence of the recorded security deed in
favor of Option One and attached to her petition a copy of
the assignment of that deed to HSBC; and HSBC attached a copy
of that security deed to its answer. And although, in her
petition, Montia did not mention the recorded security deed
that later was assigned to First-Citizens, she acknowledged
and attached to her petition a copy of that assignment, and
First-Citizens attached a copy of that security deed to its
grantor of a deed to secure debt who has not paid the debt
has no legal title to the property at issue. See McCarter
v. Bankers Trust Co., 247 Ga.App. 129, 132 (2) (543
S.E.2d 755) (2000).
A deed to secure debt passes legal title to the lender when
the deed to secure debt is created, and the owner has a mere
equity of redemption and right of possession of the realty
until the secured debt has been satisfied in full. . . . [A]s
a matter of law, title does not pass back to the grantor in
the absence of full payment of the debt.
Patel v. J. P. Morgan Chase Bank, N. A., 327 Ga.App.
321, 323 (1) (757 S.E.2d 460) (2014) (citations omitted). A
person whose property is subject to a deed to secure debt
cannot prevail in a quiet title action unless she has
satisfied the debt. See Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Mtg.