United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Waycross Division
ORDER AND MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND
STAN BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
before the Court is non-party Waseem Daker's
(“Daker”) Motion for Reconsideration of the
Court's Order dated February 28, 2017. (Doc. 55.) For the
reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Daker's Motion
for Reconsideration. Additionally, I RECOMMEND that the Court
DENY Daker leave to proceed in forma pauperis on
appeal. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to serve a copy
of this Order and Report and Recommendation upon Plaintiff
AND non-party Waseem Daker.
February 3, 2017, Daker filed a Motion to Intervene in this
case. (Doc. 36.) Daker argued that he should be allowed to
intervene as a matter of right under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 24(a) and permissively under Rule 24(b).
(Id. at p. 2.) Daker contended that intervention was
proper for his claims that his placement in the Tier II
program at Georgia State Prison violates his substantive and
procedural due process rights. As support, Daker conclusively
asserted that: his Motion was timely filed; he has a
“direct, substantial, legally protectable interest in
the proceedings” by nature of his status as a prisoner
in the Tier II segregation program; the disposition of this
case would impair his ability to protect his interest due to
stare decisis; and Plaintiff would not adequately
represent his interests. (Id. at pp. 2-4.)
February 28, 2017, the Court denied Daker's Motion to
Intervene. (Doc. 39). The Court advised Daker that the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) disallows
multiple-prisoner/plaintiff lawsuits wherein the
prisoners/plaintiffs seek to proceed in forma
pauperis together. (Id. at p. 2.) Specifically,
the Court informed Daker that a prisoner wishing to bring a
civil action in forma pauperis must pay the full
amount of the filing fee. (Id.)
instant Motion, Daker restates the arguments from his Motion
to Intervene and further argues that intervention is allowed
because neither the PLRA nor Hubbard v. Haley, 262
F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2001), applies to motions brought
pursuant to Rule 24.
Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 55)
motion for reconsideration, or a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e) motion, is “an extraordinary remedy, to
be employed sparingly.” Smith ex rel. Smith v.
Augusta-Richmond Cty., No. CV 110-126, 2012 WL 1355575,
at *1 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 18, 2012) (internal citation omitted).
“A movant must set forth facts or law of a strongly
convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior
decision.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
“The only grounds for granting a Rule 59 motion are
newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or
fact.” Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Intern., Inc.,
626 F.3d 1327, 1344 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting In re
Kellogg, 197 F.3d 1116, 1119 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal
punctuation omitted)). “A Rule 59(e) motion cannot be
used to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present
evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of
judgment.” Id. (quoting Michael Linet,
Inc. v. Village of Wellington, 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th
Cir. 2005) (alterations omitted)).
Court discerns no reason to grant Daker's Motion for
Reconsideration. Here, Daker does not present any newly-
discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact. Daker
simply attempts to argue that Hubbard does not apply
to Rule 24 motions, and that even if it did, the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Jones v.
Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007), overruled Hubbard.
However, both these arguments are without
it is true that the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed joinder rather than intervention in
Hubbard, the reasoning and analysis behind
Hubbard remain true for intervention under Rule 24.
That is, in order to curtail abusive prisoner tort, civil
rights, and conditions of confinement litigation,
“[T]he PLRA clearly and unambiguously requires that
‘if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal
in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall be required to
pay the full amount of a filing fee.'”
Hubbard, 262 F.3d at 1197 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
1915(b)(1)). Additionally, “the Congressional purpose
in promulgating the PLRA enforces an interpretation that each
prisoner pay the full filing fee.” Id. at
1197-98. In fact, the Court's reasoning in
Hubbard is especially appropriate in this case.
Daker, a known serial litigant in this district and others,
has been denied in forma pauperis status on multiple
occasions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), the
PLRA's three-strikes provision. See Daker v. Bryson, et
al., No. 6:16-cv-57-JRH-RSB, 2017 WL 242615, at *3 (S.D.
Ga. Jan. 19, 2017), report and recommendation
adopted by No. 6:16-cv-57-JRH-RSB, 2017 WL 1053082
(S.D. Ga. Mar. 20, 2017). His Motion to Intervene in this
case is a blatant attempt to circumvent the requirements of
the PLRA and is precisely the type of behavior the PLRA
sought to curtail.
Court sees no error in its analysis denying Daker's
Motion to Intervene, much less manifest error warranting
reconsideration. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Daker's
Motion for Reconsideration, (doc. 55).
Leave to Appeal in Forma Pauperis
the Court should DENY Daker in forma pauperis status
on appeal. Though Daker has, of course, not yet filed a
notice of appeal, it would be appropriate to address these
issues in the Court's order of dismissal. Fed. R. App. P.
24(a)(3) (trial court may certify that appeal is not ...