C. J., MILLER, P. J., and REESE, J.
a jury trial, Tomeka Porter was convicted of armed
robbery and sentenced to serve 20 years in
confinement. She appeals from the denial of her motion for
new trial, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to
support her conviction, and that the trial court erred in
admitting her custodial statement and the witness'
show-up identification of her as one of the offenders. For
the reasons set forth, infra, we affirm.
in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict,
record shows the following facts. On August 9, 2013, the
Appellant was in a DeKalb County hotel selling drugs when
Ladarius Clark, Teneshia Harvey, Theophilus Porter
("Porter"), and Sir Charles Wood came to her hotel
room. The Appellant voluntarily drove Clark, Harvey, Porter,
and Wood (collectively, the "co-defendants") to
Gwinnett County so the Appellant could sell cocaine. While
the Appellant drove, the co-defendants consumed drugs and
arriving in Gwinnett County, the Appellant's phone rang
and she spoke to the caller in Spanish while she stopped at a
couple of residences. After the conversation, the Appellant
told the co-defendants that the caller "had some nice
things, " he would "pay well, " and he was an
"easy target." They discussed a plan to travel to
the caller's home, "see[ ] what all he had"and
steal items from the house.
night of the robbery, the caller, "A. H., " and his
two roommates, "P. C." and "R. J., " were
at A. H.'s home. The Appellant and her co-defendants
arrived at the house around 1:00 a.m. The Appellant and her
female co-defendant, Harvey, exited the vehicle and went
inside, stayed about ten to fifteen minutes, and returned to
that visit to A. H.'s house, P. C. was asleep in the
living room. The Appellant, Harvey, and A. H. went to A.
H.'s room for a few minutes. Before leaving the
residence, the Appellant woke up P. C., kissed him, and said
"I'll come back for you." Upon returning to the
car, the Appellant told the co-defendants, "[A. H.]
ha[d] nice things" but did not pay what he owed her.
Appellant and her co-defendants drove to the end of the
street, but then decided collectively to return to the house
and steal some things. The Appellant and Harvey returned to
the house around 1:30 a.m. P. C. saw them through a window
adjacent to the door, but did not notice the three male
co-defendants hidden in the bushes around the side of the
house. When P. C. opened the door, the male co-defendants
appeared in the doorway and "jump[ed] inside" the
home, in front of the Appellant and Harvey. Once the
Appellant and her co-defendants were all inside, P. C. saw
that one of the men had a gun.
male co-defendants punched and beat P. C. and took him to
another room occupied by A. H. They asked for the
victims' wallets, keys, and cell phones. A. H. grabbed a
chair to fight back, but one of the men shot him in the
shoulder. The male co-defendants took the victims' cell
phones and a car key.
the male co-defendants were inside the residence, R. J. slept
in his bedroom. He awoke upon hearing a "ruckus" in
the home and opened his bedroom door. R. J. saw one of the
male co-defendants holding a gun. R. J. closed his bedroom
door and climbed out of his bedroom window to the street.
Appellant and Harvey exited the house, returned to the
vehicle, and the Appellant drove away. While leaving the
neighborhood, the Appellant and Harvey saw a man, later
identified as R. J., "frantically walking" down the
street with a cell phone. Harvey told the Appellant to stop
the car, after which she told the man, "I just want your
phone." R. J. gave Harvey the phone, and she and the
Appellant returned to A. H.'s residence. Once there, Wood
got into the car's backseat and the Appellant started
driving "[b]ack to DeKalb County."
a.m., a DeKalb County police officer initiated a traffic stop
of the Appellant's car because it had a "cardboard
tag." After the Appellant gave the police officer a
driver's license that was not hers and a date of birth
that did not match the license, the officer arrested her for
identity fraud. Because neither Harvey nor Wood had a valid
driver's license, several officers conducted an inventory
search in preparation for impounding the vehicle. After
discovering a handgun, the officers contacted neighboring
precincts to determine if any crimes, such as entering autos
or armed robberies, had recently occurred. The Gwinnett
County Police Department responded that there had just been a
home invasion during which someone was shot. Gwinnett County
officers brought two of the home invasion victims, P. C. and
R. J., to the site of the traffic stop. P. C. identified the
Appellant, Harvey, and Wood as being involved in the robbery,
and R. J. identified Harvey. The Appellant was taken into
Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient for a
rational trier of fact to find her guilty of armed robbery.
Generally, on appeal from a criminal conviction, the
appellate court view[s] the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict and an appellant no longer enjoys
the presumption of innocence. [The] Court determines whether
the evidence is sufficient under the standard of Jackson
v. Virginia,  and does not weigh the evidence or
determine witness credibility. Any conflicts or
inconsistencies in the evidence are for the jury to resolve.
As long as there is some competent evidence, even though
contradicted, to support each fact necessary to make out the
State's case, [the Court] must uphold the jury's
standard of Jackson v. Virginia is met if the
evidence is sufficient for any rational trier of fact to find
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime
person commits armed robbery "when, with intent to
commit theft, he or she takes property of another from the
person or the immediate presence of another by use of an
offensive weapon, or any replica, article, or device having
the appearance of such weapon." OCGA § 24-14-8
states, in part, "[t]he testimony of a single witness is
generally sufficient to establish a fact." "[A]
defendant may not be convicted on the uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice. The corroboration must be
independent of the accomplice's testimony and it must
connect the defendant to the crime or lead to the inference
that he [or she] is guilty."
trial, the jury heard the testimony of victims P. C. and R.
J. and the Appellant's co-defendants, Porter and Harvey.
Both Porter and Harvey testified that the Appellant told them
that the victims' home had "nice things, " and
that the Appellant had actively participated in the planning
and implementation of the robbery. Both testified that the
Appellant drove the co-defendants to the victims' home
for the purpose of committing the robbery. P. C. corroborated
the co-defendants' testimony by testifying that he was
" a hundred percent" sure that the Appellant was
the woman who kissed him and, later, came into the house with
the co- defendants. We ...