BARNES, P. J., MCMILLIAN and MERCIER, JJ.
Goodwin was charged by accusation in the Superior Court of
Hall County with obtaining a controlled substance by theft
(hydrocodone) (Count 1) and misdemeanor theft by taking of
tramadol (Count 2). Following a bench trial, Goodwin was
found guilty of both offenses, and she appealed the judgment
of conviction and sentence entered on those verdicts. In Case
No. A15A2213 ("Goodwin I"), this Court
reversed Goodwin's conviction on Count 1, because Goodwin
had not waived formal indictment of that offense, a felony,
and indictment was required pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-70
(a). Thus, we found that the Superior Court of Hall County
did not have jurisdiction over that offense. We affirmed
Goodwin's conviction on Count 2.
State subsequently indicted Goodwin for obtaining a
controlled substance by theft (hydrocodone), with the
charging language in the indictment being identical to that
in Count 1 in the former accusation. Goodwin filed a Plea in
Bar and Motion to Dismiss the Indictment, which the trial
court denied. Goodwin appeals, contending that the
"subsequent prosecution is barred by the procedural
aspect of the double jeopardy provisions of the U.S. and
Georgia Constitutions contained in OCGA §§ 16-1-7
and 16-1-8, and by the principle of resjudicata." For
the reasons that follow, we agree that subsequent prosecution
of this offense is barred, and reverse the trial court's
denial of Goodwin's plea in bar.
reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion for plea in
bar, where the evidence is uncontroverted and no question is
presented regarding the credibility of witnesses, we review
de novo the trial court's application of the law to the
undisputed facts." Pierce v. State, 294 Ga.
842, 843 (1) (755 S.E.2d 732) (2014).
The United States and Georgia Constitutions proscribe a
defendant's being twice placed in jeopardy for the same
offense. United States Constitution, Fifth Amendment; Georgia
Constitution, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVIII. O.C.G.A.
§§ 16-1-6, 16-1-7, and 16-1-8 extend the
proscription of double jeopardy beyond those constitutional
limits by placing limitations upon multiple prosecutions,
convictions and punishments for the same criminal conduct.
Stone v. State, 166 Ga.App. 245 (1) (304 S.E.2d 94)
State v. Martin, 173 Ga.App. 370 (326 S.E.2d 558)
These statutory provisions distinguish between two aspects of
double jeopardy - first, limitations upon multiple
prosecutions for crimes arising from the same conduct
(referred to as the procedural bar of double
jeopardy); and, second, limitations upon multiple convictions
or punishments that may be imposed for such crimes (referred
to as the substantive bar of double jeopardy).
Stephens v. Hopper, 241 Ga. 596, 598-599 (1) (247
S.E.2d 92) (1978) (discussing former OCGA §§
26-505, 26-506, 26-507).
§ 16-1-8 (b) provides, in pertinent part, that:
[a] prosecution is barred if the accused was formerly
prosecuted for a different crime or for the same crime based
on upon different facts, if such former prosecution: (1)
Resulted in either a conviction or an acquittal and the
subsequent prosecution is for a crime for which the accused
could have been convicted on the former prosecution, is for a
crime with which the accused should have been charged on the
former prosecution (unless the court ordered a separate trial
of such charge), or is for a crime which involves the same
conduct, unless each prosecution requires proof of a fact not
required on the other prosecution or unless the crime was not
consummated when the former trial began.
OCGA § 16-1-8 (d) provides, in pertinent part, that:
[a] prosecution is not barred within the meaning of [OCGA
§ 16-1-8] if: (1) The former prosecution was before a
court which lacked jurisdiction over the accused or the
crime; or (2) Subsequent proceedings resulted in the
invalidation, setting aside, reversal, or vacating of the
conviction, unless the accused was thereby adjudged not
guilty or unless there was a finding that the evidence did
not authorize the verdict.
OCGA § 16-1-7 (b) pertinently provides that "[i]f
the several crimes arising from the same conduct are known to
the proper prosecuting officer at the time of commencing the
prosecution and are within the jurisdiction of a single