MCFADDEN, P. J., BRANCH and BETHEL, JJ.
Walker, pro se, appeals the denial of his motion to correct
an illegal and/or void sentence. Walker contends that the
imposed sentence of life with parole is void because the
trial court did not use its discretion when sentencing him,
and the sentence itself is indeterminate. We agree with the
trial court that Walker's allegations are without merit
1991, Walker was sentenced to life with parole following his
armed robbery conviction. He appealed, and this Court
affirmed his conviction in May 1992. In June 2016, Walker filed a
post-conviction motion to void his sentence and asked the
trial court to conduct a re-sentencing hearing. The trial
court denied the motion because the sentence imposed was
allowed by law, and this appeal followed.
Walker contends the trial court erred because it did not use
its discretion to sentence him to less time, and because it
relied on the State's argument that his criminal record
constituted aggravating circumstances, resulting in severe
punishment. We disagree.
§ 16-8-41 (b) as it existed on March 6, 1991-the date
the crime was committed-provided that "[a] person
convicted of the offense of armed robbery shall be punished
by death or imprisonment for life or by imprisonment
for not less than five nor more than 20 years."
(emphasis supplied). Life with parole was a valid sentence
which fell within the statutory range of punishment for armed
robbery, and required no aggravating circumstances in order
to be imposed. Further, Walker's contention that the
trial court confused the terms "aggravation" with
"recidivism" is without support. "Assertions
taking issue with the procedure employed in imposing a valid
sentence or questioning the fairness of an imposed sentence.
. . are not a means for. . . sentence modification."
Jones v. State, 278 Ga. 669, 670 (604 S.E.2d 483)
(2004) (citations and punctuation omitted). "So long as
the sentence imposed is within the statutory limits, we will
not disturb it." Gillespie v. State, 311
Ga.App. 442, 442 (715 S.E.2d 832) (2011) (citations omitted).
Walker further contends that under OCGA § 17-10-1 the
sentence of life with parole is void because it is an
indeterminate punishment. Under Georgia law, "[a]
sentence is void if the court imposes punishment that the law
does not allow." Jones, 278 Ga. at 670
(citations and punctuation omitted). This means that in
support of his motion, Walker was required to demonstrate
that the sentence of life with parole is a punishment not
allowed by law. Burg v. State, 297 Ga.App. 118,
118-19 (676 S.E.2d 465) (2009). Walker alleges that the trial
court erred because it was required to prescribe with
specificity the maximum time he was to serve and failed to do
so. We disagree.
support of his argument, Walker focuses on the language of
OCGA § 17-10-1(a) (1) as it existed on March 6, 1991,
which provided in part that "[e]xcept in cases in which
life imprisonment or the death penalty must be
imposed . . . the judge fixing the sentence shall prescribe a
determinate sentence for a specific number of months or
years. . . ." (emphasis supplied). However, Walker
fails to recognize that OCGA § 16-8-41 (b) was also in
effect and applicable at the same time and allowed for a
sentence of life imprisonment, or a sentence from five to
twenty years for armed robbery. Even if we concede that
reading OCGA § 16-8-41 (b) and OCGA § 17-10-1 (a)
(1) together, as they existed at the time, creates an
ambiguity, in resolving any ambiguity we look to the more
specific code section and agree with the trial court that
Walker's sentence is legitimate. See Stovall v.
State, 216 Ga.App. 138, 141 (7) (453 S.E.2d 110) (1995).
addressing the scope of their applicability, OCGA §
17-10-1 (a) (1) is a general sentencing statute while OCGA
§ 16-8-41 (b) establishes the range of sentences
authorized specifically for the crime of armed
robbery. Because the specific statute prevails over
the general statute, absent any indication of a contrary
legislative intent, a sentence of life with parole is a
lawful sentence. Burke v. State, 274 Ga.App. 402,
404-05 (618 S.E.2d 36) (2005) (citations omitted).
Accordingly, Walker's sentence for armed robbery is not
void as a matter of law, and this Court has no basis to
disturb the sentence on appeal.
McFadden, P J, and Branch, J, concur.
Walker v. State, 204 Ga.App.
269, 269 (419 S.E.2d 542) ...