C. J., MILLER, P. J., and REESE, J.
Miller, Presiding Judge.
Jody Massey appeals from the trial court's order granting
summary judgment to Allstate Insurance Company
("Allstate") on her claim for uninsured /
underinsured motorist ("UM") coverage under her
umbrella policy with Allstate.Massey contends on appeal that the
trial court erred when it ruled that her Allstate umbrella
policy did not include UM coverage at the time of the
accident at issue in this case. For the reasons that follow,
we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the case
for further proceedings.
judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. We review a trial court's grant of summary judgment
de novo, construing the evidence, and all reasonable
conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in favor of the
nonmovant." (Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Thomas v. Summers, 329 Ga.App. 250, 250 (764 S.E.2d
578) (2014); see also OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
viewed, the evidence shows that Massey suffered several
injuries when a truck being driven by Brett Pruitt collided
with a car being driven by Massey on June 11, 2012. In May
2014, she filed this action against Pruitt, seeking monetary
damages for her injuries. Massey subsequently settled with
Pruitt in exchange for $100, 000, the limits of his
automobile insurance policy. Massey then amended her
complaint to add a claim for a declaratory judgment to
establish UM coverage and limits under both her primary
automobile and umbrella policies with Allstate. Massey later
settled her primary automobile policy claim with Allstate for
the UM coverage limits of $100, 000.
discovery, Allstate moved for summary judgment on
Massey's claim under her umbrella policy, asserting that
the policy had ceased to include UM coverage in June 2010.
The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment to
Allstate. This appeal followed.
challenges the trial court's determination that her
Allstate umbrella policy did not include UM coverage at the
time of her accident with Pruitt. She contends that the trial
court erred when it ruled that (a) Georgia's automobile
policy non-renewal statute, OCGA § 33-24-45, does not
apply to umbrella policies that include automobile coverage,
and (b) as a result, Allstate was not required to comply with
the statute's non-renewal notice requirements when, in
2010, it purportedly cancelled the UM coverage previously
included in Massey's umbrella policy. We agree.
2009, Allstate issued primary automobile and umbrella
insurance policies to Massey. The umbrella policy included
both excess liability coverage of $5, 000, 000 per occurrence
and UM coverage of $5, 000, 000 per accident. Separate premiums
were assessed for each type of coverage. In May 2010,
Allstate renewed Massey's umbrella policy for one year,
effective June 30, 2010. The 2010 renewal documents again
included excess liability coverage of $5, 000, 000 per
occurrence, for which a premium was assessed. The documents
indicated, however, that the policy no longer included UM
coverage and, accordingly, did not assess a separate premium
for such coverage. A subsequent notice dated June 2, 2010,
indicated that Massey's excess liability limits had been
reduced to $1, 000, 000 per occurrence and again included no
UM coverage. The 2011 umbrella policy renewal
documents, which covered the time period in which the
accident at issue occurred, similarly listed Massey's
excess liability limits as $1, 000, 000 per occurrence and
again included no UM coverage.
primary dispute in this case centers on whether Allstate
properly cancelled the UM coverage it previously had provided
under Massey's umbrella policy when it allegedly mailed a
notice to her in May 2010 indicating that it was not renewing
the UM coverage. To answer this question, we first must
determine whether OCGA § 33-24-45 - which contains the
requirements with which an insurer must comply to effectively
cancel or refuse to renew automobile policy coverages -
applies to Massey's umbrella policy with Allstate. If so,
we then must consider whether Allstate properly complied with
the statutory requirements when it purported to cancel the UM
coverage previously included in that policy. We address each
question in turn.
Application of OCGA § 33-24-45 to Massey's umbrella
maintains that OCGA § 33-24-45 governs her umbrella
policy, while Allstate contends that the statute applies only
to primary automobile policies and not to umbrella policies.
interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we
review de novo. Hill v. First Atlantic Bank, 323
Ga.App. 731, 732 (747 S.E.2d 892) (2013). "When we
consider the meaning of a statute, we must presume that the
General Assembly meant what it said and said what it
meant." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Deal v.
Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) (751 S.E.2d 337)
(2013). "[T]he cardinal rule is to glean the intent of
the legislature in the light of the legislative intent as
found in the statute as a whole." (Citation and
punctuation omitted.) Abrohams v. Atlantic Mut. Ins.
Agency, 282 Ga.App. 176, 178 (1) (638 S.E.2d 330)
(2006). In doing so, we "follow the literal language of
the statute unless it produces contradiction, absurdity, or
such an inconvenience as to ensure that the legislature meant
something else. Absent clear evidence that a contrary meaning
was intended by the legislature, we assign words in a statute
their ordinary, logical, and common meanings." (Citation
and punctuation omitted.) Turner v. Ga. River
Network, 297 Ga. 306, 308 (773 S.E.2d 706) (2015).
these broad canons of statutory construction in mind, we note
that statutes governing UM insurance "are remedial in
nature and must be broadly construed to accomplish the
legislative purpose." (Citation and punctuation
omitted.) Abrohams, supra, 282 Ga.App. at 178 (1).
Further, "provisions in insurance policies that conflict
with the plain terms of Georgia's ...