United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Statesboro Division
RANDAL HALL CHIFE JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.
present action stems from an unfortunate dispute between a
charity seeking to assist wounded veterans, Purple Heart
Homes, Inc. ("Purple Heart Homes''), and a
wounded veteran it sought to assist, Hamilton Kinard. At this
stage the Court must determine if the complaint filed by Mr.
Kinard and his wife contains claims for which the law
provides a remedy and whether those claims are supported by
factual allegations of sufficient specificity. (Doc. 5.) The
Court finds the complaint deficient in both regards.
Heart Homes is a charity established by wounded veterans for
wounded veterans. After sustaining serious injuries in
Operation Iraqi Freedom, John Gallina and Dale Beauty saw a
need for housing that could properly accommodate disabled
veterans. (Doc. 5 at 2.) lip. 2008, they established Purple
Heart Homes to address that need. (Id.)
Heart Homes helps place veterans in new, handicap-accessible
homes at a substantial discount. (Id.) It does this
by requiring that participating veterans take out two loans,
one worth approximately 20% of the home's value and a
second worth the remaining amount. (Id.) If the
veteran successfully pays off the 20% loan, then Purple Heart
Homes waives repayment of the second loan. (Id.)
Thus, qualifying veterans can receive handicap-accessible
housing at a nearly 80% discount. (Id. at 3.)
8, 2013, Plaintiffs entered into a contract ("the
Contract") with Purple Heart Homes to purchase a house.
(Doc. 1-2 at 3.) The Contract set the purchase price at $175,
000, and it required Plaintiffs to obtain two loans: a
"First Priority Loan'7 worth $31, 500, and a
"Second Priority Loan" worth $145, 000.
(Id.) The Contract also contained several important
provisions. First, the Contract established that it, alone, i
"shall be deemed to contain all of the terms and
conditions agreed upon, it being understood that there are no
outside representations, warranties, or agreements, either
written or oral." (Id. at 6.) Second, it
provided that "[t]he Buyer acknowledges that this is an
'AS IS' purchase. The Buyer is relying solely on
his/her inspection of the Property and any private
inspections that the Buyer chooses to obtain."
(Id.) Third, the Contract specified that "the
Seller cannot provide any warranty on any repairs or
renovations that they had performed on the property."
(Id.) Fourth, it admitted that "the Seller has
agreed to perform certain repairs and i modifications to the
Property, " and it listed those repairs in Exhibit D.
(Id.) Finally, the Contract clarified that "the
Buyer acknowledges that they have been advised to consult
competent legal counsel before entering into a real estate
purchase agreement, " and "that a Private Home
Inspection is recommended." (Id.)
22, 2013, Plaintiffs gaye a Promissory Note to Purple Heart
Homes. (Doc. 1-2 at 16.); The Note provided that it should be
marked "Paid and Satisfied" and the related
security deed canceled within six months of either the
Borrower successfully paying off the First Priority Loan or
fifteen years, whichever occurred first. (Id.)
February 15, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in state court.
(Doc. 1-1 at 11.) Plaintiffs make three allegations in their
complaint. First, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants breached
two separate contracts, (Id. at 12.) Plaintiffs
allege that Defendants breached the original Contract for
sale and a second, subsequent contract formed through the
legal concept of novation. Plaintiffs claim damages in excess
of $500, 000 as a result of Defendants' alleged breach of
Plaintiffs allege that "Defendants were negligent in
purporting to perform" the Contract. (Id. at
14.) Plaintiffs assert that "Defendants intentionally
allowed inept and unqualified supervision and inept and
unqualified volunteers to engage upon the repairs and
construction promised." (Id.) Plaintiffs also
assert that "Plaintiffs show that Defendants have
exhibited a pattern of such breach of contract and such
negligence in their prior dealings with other veterans."
(Id.) Plaintiffs' complaint, however, does not
provide any additional allegations detailing such prior
Plaintiffs allege a claim for stubborn litigiousness.
(Id.) Plaintiffs allege only that "Defendants
have acted in bad faith, have been stubbornly litigious, and
have caused Plaintiffs undue and unnecessary trouble and
expense in terms of O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 and Plaintiffs
are entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees and
their costs and expenses." (Id.) Plaintiffs
provide no further details supporting this allegation.
April 2016, Defendants removed the case to this Court,
asserting diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
(Doc. 1.) Plaintiffs made no attempt to amend their complaint
after removal. Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiffs'
complaint. (Doc. 5.)
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'"
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 556 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). Applying this standard requires a two-part test.
See id. at 679. First, the Court asks whether the
plaintiff has stated specific facts supporting a claim rather
than mere legal conclusions. Id. Second, it asks
whether those facts might plausibly give rise to a right to
relief. Id. at 680.
first prong of the inquiry requires that the plaintiff plead
"factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged." Id. at 678. While the
Court must accept as "true all of the allegations
contained in a complaint, " it must not "accept as
true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation." Id. Generalized conclusions and
"bare allegations" will not allow the plaintiff to
"unlock the doors of discovery." See id.
The plaintiff ...