BARNES, P. J., MCMILLIAN and MERCIER, JJ.
Barnes, Presiding Judge.
Bostic appeals from the denial of his motion for new trial,
following his convictions for voluntary manslaughter,
aggravated assault and possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon. He was sentenced to thirty-five years, with twenty-two
years to be served in confinement. On appeal, Bostic contends
that trial counsel was ineffective, that the jury was
improperly influenced by a photograph of the deceased victim
displayed on a television monitor and shirts worn in the
courtroom, and that the jury selection resulting in an
all-white jury was unconstitutional. Following our review, we
On appeal from a criminal conviction, a defendant no longer
enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the evidence is
viewed in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict. We
neither weigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of
witnesses, but merely ascertain that the evidence is
sufficient to prove each element of the crime beyond a
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Fuller v. State,
320 Ga.App. 620 (740 S.E.2d 346) (2013).
viewed, the evidence demonstrates that after an early morning
shooting at a nightclub that left one victim dead and another
with gunshot injuries, Bostic was indicted on charges of
malice murder, felony murder, three counts of aggravated
assault and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
After a jury trial, Bostic was found guilty of two counts of
voluntary manslaughter as lesser included offenses to the
malice murder and felony murder charges, three counts of
aggravated assault and possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon. Bostic filed a motion for new trial on general
grounds, which he later amended to raise claims that trial
counsel was ineffective and that a photograph of the victim
was improperly displayed during trial and on t-shirts worn in
the courtroom. Following a hearing, the trial court denied
Bostic's motion, and this appeal ensued.
Bostic first contends that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to adequately explain and preserve his right to
present the affirmative defense of self-defense. He maintains
that trial counsel's failure to file a notice of an
affirmative defense pursuant to OCGA § 17-16-5 barred
him from asserting his self-defense claim during the trial.
We do not agree.
prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
must show [both] that trial counsel's performance [was
deficient in that it] fell below a reasonable standard of
conduct and that [it was prejudicial because] there existed a
reasonable probability that the outcome of the case would
have been different had it not been for counsel's
deficient performance. If [Bostic] fails to [prove] either
prong of the [two-part] test, this relieves the reviewing
court of the need to address the other prong.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Scott v. State,
290 Ga. 883, 889 (7) (725 S.E.2d 305) (2012). "The trial
court's determination with respect to effective
assistance of counsel will be affirmed unless its findings
are clearly erroneous." (Citation omitted.) Johnson
v. State, 287 Ga. 767, 769 (2) (700 S.E.2d 346) (2010).
Georgia law, a defendant is required, upon demand by the
State, to provide written notice of his intent to rely upon
alibi evidence, and such notice must be provided no later
than ten days prior to trial. OCGA § 17-16-5
Where a defendant fails to provide such notice, a trial court
"may order the defendant to permit the discovery or
inspection [of the evidence or] interview of the witness,
grant a continuance, or, upon a showing of prejudice and bad
faith, prohibit the defendant from introducing the evidence
not disclosed or presenting the witness not disclosed."
OCGA § 17-16-6.
although the State filed a notice for demand of alibi
defense, Bostic never maintained a defense of alibi. See OCGA
§ 17-16-5 (a); Matthews v. State, 285 Ga.App.
859, 862 (2) (648 S.E.2d 160) (2007) (alibi is not an
affirmative defense.) Instead, his affirmative defense was
that he had shot the victims in self-defense, a theory that
was advanced by Bostic during his testimony. See Paul v.
State, 266 Ga.App. 126 (596 S.E.2d 670) (2004)
(self-defense is an affirmative defense). Moreover, the trial
court also charged the jury on self-defense, justification,
and accident. Thus, Bostic has not demonstrated, as he now
asserts, that he was prejudiced because he was prevented from
presenting the affirmative defense of self-defense at trial.
See generally Murray v. State, 295 Ga. 289, 291 (1)
(759 S.E.2d 525) (2014) (jury entitled to disbelieve
affirmative defense of self-defense).
although the transcript of the motion for new trial hearing
is not included with the record on appeal, in its order
denying Bostic's motion for new trial, the trial court
found that, based on trial counsel's testimony at the new
trial hearing, Bostic initially desired to advance a defense
of innocence rather than self-defense, and he desired to do
so, in part, because he did not want to testify at trial
because of a prior conviction, and changed his mind about
testifying at the conclusion of the State's case. The
trial court found that, based on the hearing testimony,
"[t]rial counsel's choice of [trial] strategy was
consistent with [Bostic's] desire and it was a reasonable
choice based upon the pretrial assessment." "As a
general rule, matters of reasonable tactics and strategy,
whether wise or unwise, do not amount to ineffective
assistance of counsel." Grier v. State, 273 Ga.
363, 365 (4) (541 S.E.2d 369) (2001). Accordingly, trial
counsel's performance was not deficient in this regard,
nor has Bostic demonstrated prejudice.
also contends that trial counsel failed to sufficiently
assert the defense of self-defense "through a series of
errors, " and did not object to the prosecutions
prejudicial statement about his right to remain silent. He
does not, however, support either assertion with any
argument, citations to the record or legal authority.
Accordingly, we deem the arguments abandoned. See Court of
Appeals Rule 25 (c) (2) ("Any enumeration of error which
is not supported in the brief by citation of authority or
argument may be deemed abandoned.") Patterson v.
State, 327 Ga.App. 695, 698 (3) (761 S.E.2d 101) (2014)
(deeming arguments of ...