United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Macon Division
STEPHEN HYLES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
pending before the Court is Waseem Daker's motion to
intervene (ECF No. 109), filed on April 20, 2017. On April
27, 2017, Defendants Bobbitt, Bostick, Giles, McLaughlin, and
Ridley filed a joint response to Daker's motion. (ECF No.
111.) Daker filed a reply on May 8, 2017. (ECF No. 113.)
Daker's motion is ripe for review. For the reasons
discussed herein, Daker's motion is denied.
Darnell Nolley filed this § 1983 action on March 1,
2015. Compl. 7, ECF No. 1. Though the case was initially
dismissed, Plaintiff was granted leave to file a
post-judgment motion to amend his complaint-salvaging his
claims. Plaintiff's April 21, 2015 Amended Complaint (ECF
No. 12) is the controlling complaint of this case. Order 3,
June 1, 2015, ECF No. 11. Defendants filed a pre-answer
motion to dismiss (ECF No. 21) on July 27, 2015. Pursuant to
the ruling on that motion to dismiss, only Plaintiff's
Fourteenth Amendment claims against Defendants in their
individual capacities for nominal damages were allowed to
proceed. Order 4, March 29, 2016, ECF No. 54. Defendants
filed their Answer (ECF No. 57) on April 12, 2016. The
discovery period ended almost eight months ago, on September
21, 2016. Order 1, Aug. 22, 2016, ECF No. 80. Defendants
filed a motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 86) on October
21, 2016. On December 19, 2016, Plaintiff Nolley filed his
response. (ECF No. 93.) Defendants filed a reply on January
26, 2017. (ECF No. 95.) Discovery is closed and the pending
dispositive motion is fully briefed and ripe for ruling, yet
Daker filed the instant motion to intervene on April 17,
2017-some two years after the initiation of this lawsuit.
Intervention of Right
asserts that he is entitled of intervention of right. The
Court disagrees. Intervention of right occurs where an
individual files a timely motion and
claims an interest relating to the property or transaction
that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that
disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or
impede the movant's ability to protect its interest,
unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Daker clearly does not meet this
standard. Ignoring any discussion of the timelineness of his
motion-filed some two years after the action, after the close
of discovery and the time to file dispositive motions-Daker
seeks wholly different relief, for different claims, based on
different facts and different legal issues than Plaintiff. He
can, in no way, claim an actual legal interest relating to
the property or transaction that is the subject of this
action. Plaintiff's claims arise from his allegation that
his due process rights were violated when he was purportedly
denied a proper hearing before being placed in Tier II
confinement. Daker challenges a myriad of his conditions of
confinement. In fact, Daker has filed his own lawsuits
asserting various constitutional violations, and
those are the proper vehicle for litigating his
claims. Daker has no intervention as a matter of right under
the Federal Rules.
reasons discussed herein, permissive intervention is
inappropriate and the Court declines to exercise its
discretion to grant the same. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
24(b). Daker attempts to use permissive intervention to
circumvent the PLRA three strike and exhaustion requirements.
Such requirements are part of Congress's legitimate
effort to curtail abusive litigation and this Court will not
permit Daker to usurp Congress's authority to do so.
“three strikes” provision of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) prohibits a
prisoner from bringing a civil action in forma
if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while
incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action
or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed
on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, ...