United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Savannah Division
JULIAN C. LANE, Plaintiff,
v.
S BANK, Defendant.
ORDER
WILLIAM T. MOORE, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before
the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (Doc. 36) and
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 29). For the
following reasons, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (Doc. 36)
is DENIED. Plaintiff shall have thirty days from the date of
this order to file an amended complaint alleging claims under
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA"). As a result, Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 29) is DISMISSED AS MOOT.[1]Defendant shall
have thirty days from the date Plaintiff files an amended
complaint to refile a motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
Julian C. Lane, Jr. was employed as the President of First
Citizens Bank-the predecessor to Defendant S Bank. (Doc. 26
at 1.) On June 2, 2003, Plaintiff signed a Salary
Continuation Agreement with First Citizens Bank ("the
bank"). The agreement provided Plaintiff with a valuable
retirement benefit that was subject to the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001 et seq. ("ERISA"). (Id.
at 3.) Plaintiff continued working for the bank for the next
several years.
In
2008, the economy began to negatively affect many Georgia
banks. (Id. at 2.) By 2009, the bank was
experiencing difficulties meeting its loan repayment
obligations. (Id.) Plaintiff offered to resign in
order to reduce the bank's overhead. (Id.) The
bank declined Plaintiff's offer, and Plaintiff continued
working. (Id.)
In May
2010, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the bank asked
Plaintiff to surrender the benefits provided by his Salary
Continuation Agreement in order to strengthen the bank's
capital position. (Id. at 3.) The Chairman and Vice
Chairman told Plaintiff that if he agreed to release the
benefits provided under the Salary Continuation Agreement,
Plaintiff could remain employed by the bank. (Id.)
Contrary to those assertions, the agreement Plaintiff
actually signed stated that "[n]o portion of this
Termination Agreement shall be construed as an obligation on
the part of the Bank to continue the employment of the
Executive by the Bank or any of its affiliates or to retain
the services of the Executive in any other capacity."
(Doc. 1 at 60.) On June 1, 2010, Plaintiff signed the
agreement to surrender his Salary Continuation Agreement.
(Id.)
Unbeknownst
to Plaintiff, members of the bank's board had contacted
an individual named Mr. Worel to replace Plaintiff as CEO of
First Citizens. (Doc. 26 at 5.) In December 2011, members of
Defendant's board asked Plaintiff to retire.
(Id. at 4.) Plaintiff refused this request stating
that he needed to continue working to make up the money he
lost by terminating his Salary Continuation Agreement.
(Id.) Later that month, the board terminated
Plaintiff and replaced him with Mr. Worel. (Id.) As
a result, Plaintiff lost both his job and his retirement
benefits.
In
April 2014, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the State Court of
Liberty County. (Doc. 1.) Although that complaint set out the
facts of the case as discussed above and alleged damages in
excess of $840, 000.00, it failed to allege any cause of
action. (Id.) Nevertheless, Defendant removed the
case to this Court on May 8, 2014, arguing that the complaint
alleged a federal question because Plaintiff's claims
were subject to ERISA. (Id. at 2.) Defendant argued
that Plaintiff's agreement was a "top hat plan"
that was "unfunded and [] maintained by an employer
primarily for the purpose of providing deferred compensation
for a select group of management or highly compensated
employees." (Id. at 3.) Defendant reasoned that
any complaint brought subject to the Salary Continuation
Agreement was removable to federal court by virtue of ERISA
preemption. (Id.)
On May
15, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion to remand, arguing that
his claims were not subject to ERISA. (Doc. 5.) On May 23,
2014, Defendant filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
(Doc. 8.) On July 1, 2015, this Court denied both motions and
ordered Plaintiff to re-plead the complaint because the
initial complaint was wholly underdeveloped. (Doc. 24.)
Plaintiff
filed an amended complaint on July 17, 2015. (Doc.
21.) That amended complaint included one claim of
fraud in the inducement, one claim of promissory estoppel,
one claim of breach of fiduciary duty, and one claim for
attorney's fees. Defendant then filed a Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. 29) and Plaintiff filed a renewed Motion to Remand
(Doc. 36) . Plaintiff argues that the case should be remanded
because he has not raised any claims pursuant to ERISA.
(Id.) Defendant argues that removal was proper
because ERISA preempts all of Defendant's state law
claims. (Doc. 38.)
ANALYSIS
In
general terms, federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction: they may only hear cases that they have been
authorized to hear by the Constitution or Congress. See
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375
(1994). For cases first filed in state court, a defendant may
remove the matter to federal court only if the original case
could have been brought in federal court. 28 U.S.C. §
1441(a). Conversely, if no basis for subject matter
jurisdiction exists, a party may move to remand the case back
to state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). When a
defendant removes a case filed in state court, the defendant
normally has the burden of proving the existence of federal
subject matter jurisdiction. Williams v. Best Buy
Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001). One type of
case for which district courts have original jurisdiction are
those "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. These
cases are typically referred to as cases involving a federal
question.
Whether
a case involves a federal question is determined by
evaluating the plaintiff's complaint for a federal cause
of action. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers
Vacation Tr. for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 9-10
(1983). Even where a plaintiff's complaint alleges only
state law claims, the case may be removed "when a
federal statute wholly displaces the state-law cause of
action through complete pre-emption." Beneficial
Nat. Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003). One such
statute is ERISA. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542
U.S. 200, 208 (2004). As the Supreme Court has acknowledged,
Congress enacted ERISA to protect . . . the interests of
participants in employee benefit plans and their
beneficiaries by setting out substantive regulatory
requirements for employee benefit plans and to provid[e] for
appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the
Federal courts. The purpose of ERISA is to provide a uniform
regulatory regime over employee benefit plans. To this end,
ERISA includes expansive pre-emption provisions, ...