ELLINGTON, P. J., ANDREWS and RICKMAN, JJ.
appellee, Trinitec Portfolio Services, LLC, commenced this
action seeking, inter alia, a first priority lien on property
it had redeemed following a tax sale and the right to pursue
a judicial foreclosure to satisfy its lien. The appellant,
Crandall Postell, who acquired an interest in the subject
property from the owners, was allowed to intervene. Following
the trial court's grant of summary judgment for Trinitec,
January 6, 2015, Bay Point Capital Partners, L.P., purchased
a tax deed to a Houston County residence owned by Alvin and
Laura Daniels. The tax lien on the property was only $7,
433.55, but Bay Point paid $145, 000 for the tax deed. In
February 2015, Trinitec acquired a $1, 525.81 lien against
the property held by the homeowners' association, and on
March 15, 2015, Trinitec redeemed the property by paying Bay
Point $174, 000, the redemption amount required by OCGA
§ 48-4-42. Bay Point in turn executed a quitclaim deed
of redemption to the Daniels, indicating Trinitec as
lienholder and creditor. On March 27, 2015, before commencing
this action, Trinitec asserted a claim with the Houston
County tax commissioner for the $137, 566.45 in excess tax
sale funds, and on April 9, 2015, the tax commissioner paid
Trinitec as requested.
Postell contends the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment for Trinitec, because Trinitec failed to prove it
possessed an interest in the property that authorized it to
redeem it. We agree.
Georgia, only certain persons are authorized to redeem
property from a tax sale. OCGA § 48-4-40 authorizes
redemption by the defendant in fi. fa. or any person having
any right, title, or interest in or lien upon such property.
OCGA § 48-4-41 authorizes redemption by a creditor of
the defendant in fi. fa. who has no lien." (Punctuation
omitted.) DRST Holdings, Ltd. v. Brown, 290 Ga. 317,
318 (2) (720 S.E.2d 626) (2012). In order to show it
possessed a property interest that authorized its redemption
of the property, Trinitec relied upon a homeowners'
association's assignment of a lien for unpaid association
dues that it acquired in February 2015.
that assignment identifies the property owners as Alvin and
Laura Davis, not Alvin and Laura Daniels. The assignment
references the lien book and page number where the lien was
previously recorded in 2011, and that earlier recorded lien
does identify the Daniels as the owners of the property.
Presumably, the February 2015 assignment actually pertains to
the Daniels property instead of a Davis property. But we are
unable to hold that Trinitec was entitled to summary judgment
based on that assignment alone, as all ambiguities and doubts
must be resolved against the movant and in favor of the party
opposing the motion. Kirk v. Ashley, 199 Ga.App.
805, 807 (3) (406 S.E.2d 82) (1991).
also contends Trinitec's proof of its payment to Bay
Point to redeem the property was not conclusive and did not
support summary judgment that Trinitec had lawfully redeemed
the property. To show that it actually paid $174, 000 to
redeem the property so as to give rise to its first priority
lien against the property, Trinitec submitted a Chase Bank
Wire Transfer Outgoing Request form dated March 5, 2015.
Nothing on the form indicates the transfer actually was
accomplished, however, and when Trinitec had the opportunity
to add certainty to the issue of payment by answering
Postell's interrogatory about the amount and form of
payment Trinitec paid Bay Point, Trinitec objected to the
interrogatory on the ground it was vague and ambiguous.
Nevertheless, the record also contains the quitclaim deed of
redemption executed by Bay Point, which does clearly indicate
Trinitec paid the redemption price as fixed by Georgia law.
For that reason, Postell's contention regarding the lack
of proof of payment of the redemption price is without merit.
granting summary judgment for Trinitec, the trial court found
Trinitec's property interest existed at the time of the
tax sale and that Trinitec had properly redeemed the
property. In holding Trinitec was entitled "to their
first priority lien status and the remaining amount owed on
its first priority lien as well as the right to foreclose on
the subject property to satisfy such lien, " the trial
court in part relied upon United Capital Financial of
Atlanta, LLC v. American Investment Assoc., 302 Ga.App.
400 (691 S.E.2d 272) (2010), in which this Court held that a
redeeming creditor could both redeem the property and receive
excess tax sale funds to apply towards the priority lien
created by the redemption.
in DLT List v. M7Ven Supportive Housing & Dev.
Group, 335 Ga.App. 318, 323 (779 S.E.2d 436) (2015), we
disapproved of that ruling in United Capital
Financial and clarified that a redeeming creditor could
only make a claim against the excess tax sale funds for the
amount of the pre-tax sale lien that gave it the right to
redeem. "It is the redemption price, however, that would
not be recoverable from the excess and would be the first
priority lien . . . against the property going forward."
Id. at 323-324. In the instant case, as Trinitec has
already obtained the excess tax sale funds based on its
asserted lien resulting from the redemption of the property,
it was allowed to do what was specifically prohibited in
event Trinitec is subsequently able to resolve the issue
regarding the February 2015 assignment in its favor, the
trial court must also re-evaluate its ruling in light of our
holding in DLT List.
Postell's other enumerations of error, which are not
supported by citation of authority, are deemed abandoned.
Court of Appeals Rule 25 (c) (2).
Ellington, P. J., and ...