United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Statesboro Division
RANDAL HALL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Court sentenced Defendant Kyle Michael Brewer to serve life
plus five years in prison in 1996 following his conviction at
trial for various cocaine and crack cocaine offenses. On
September 8, 2015, the sentence was reduced to 387 months
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). At present, Brewer
has filed a "Request for Immediate Release Under the
Holloway Doctrine." The Government opposes the motion.
of criminal sentences is a hallmark principle of our judicial
system. See Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295,
309 (2005) (xx [T] he United States has an
interest in the finality of sentences imposed by its own
courts."); Teacrue v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309
(1989) ("Without finality, the criminal law is deprived
of much of its deterrent effect.") Brewer has a very
long and vexatious history of attacking his criminal
sentence, driving one of my brethren to twice enjoin him from
filing motions in his habeas case. (Docs. 1062, 1096.)
Nevertheless, in this instance, Brewer has seized upon what
he perceives as a new opportunity to revisit his sentence
based upon a decision out of the Eastern District of New
York, United States v. Holloway, 68 F.Supp.3d 310
(E.D.N.Y. 2014). Unfortunately for Brewer, his case is not
the same as the case of Francois Holloway.
Holloway case, the United States Attorney for the
Eastern District of New York, upon the entreaty of the
sentencing judge, vacated two of Holloway's three 18
U.S.C. § 924(c) convictions because the resulting
sentence was unjustly severe. Id. at 314-15. The
United States Attorney also noted Holloway's
*extraordinary" record while in the custody of the
Bureau of Prisons. Id. at 315. Importantly, the
Holloway court observed that its decision was not a
threat to the rule of finality: "There are no floodgates
to worry about; the authority exercised in this case will be
used only as often as the Department of Justice itself
chooses to exercise it, which will no doubt be
sparingly." Id. at 316.
Brewer is surely aware, this Court cannot reduce a sentence
once it has been imposed except under three limited
exceptions, none of which apply here. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2). This Court has no other broad inherent or
residual power to reduce sentences. United States v.
Phillips, 597 F.3d 1190, 1194-95 (11th Cir.
2010) ("The authority of a district court to modify an
imprisonment sentence is narrowly limited by statute.").
Even the Holloway court recognized that there were
"no legal avenues or bases for vacating"
Holloway's sentence. 68 F.Supp.3d at 314. Rather, the
sentence reduction in Holloway depended entirely
upon the acquiescence of the Government, i.e, by and through
the prosecutorial prerogative of the Department of Justice.
case at bar, the Government has made clear that it is
unwilling to consent to any relief for Kyle Michael Brewer.
Without the Government's involvement, Holloway
has no application here. Further, this Court is not inclined
to intercede in this matter with the Department of Justice.
Of note, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the
sentencing judge in 2012 to deny a sentence reduction to
which Brewer was otherwise entitled after considering the
factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). (See Order of
March 6, 2012, Doc. 991, aff'd United States v.
Brewer, No. 12-11431 (11th Cir. Sept. 17,
2013) (finding the district court did not abuse its
discretion to deny the § 3582 sentence reduction), Doc.
1094.) And although a different district judge ultimately
reduced Brewer's sentence to 387 months, there was no
indication that the 3 87-month sentence was thought to be
unduly harsh. (See Doc. 1119.) Thus, another
district judge and the court of appeals have already
determined that Brewer's imposed sentence is not overly
severe or manifestly unjust. The undersigned judge concurs.
the Court is constrained to note that Holloway is a
district court decision and has no binding effect on this
Court. Nor did Holloway create an actionable new
right under federal law. The Eleventh Circuit has not even
addressed the so-called Holloway Doctrine. Simply
put, Holloway in no way controls this Court's
ability or inclination to reduce Brewer's sentence.
Accord United States v. Horton, No.
2:12-CR-00007-F1, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78611 (E.D. N.C. June
16, 2016) (observing that the Holloway Doctrine is
not so much a doctrine as it is "a single case carrying
no precedential weight in this court").
the foregoing, Defendant's *Request for Immediate Release
Under the Holloway Doctrine" (doc. 1133) is DENIED.
 Both injunctions were vacated by the
Eleventh Circuit as overbroad. (Docs. 1095, 1110.) There is
currently no injunction in place against Brewer's filing
activities, but he is forewarned that this district judge
will not look any more favorably upon frivolous, repetitive,