United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division
OPINION AND ORDER
WILLIAM S. DUFFEY JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter is before the Court on Defendant Joshua Davis'
(“Defendant”) Motion for Release Pending
Sentencing  (“Motion”).
March 14, 2017, Defendant was found guilty by a jury of one
count of Theft of Credit Union Funds, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2113(b), and one count of Possession of Stolen
Credit Union Funds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(c).
(; ). The Court remanded Defendant to the custody of
the United States Marshals Service pending sentencing.
(). The Court found that detention was proper in this
case under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a), which states that a
“judicial officer shall order that a person who has
been found guilty of an offense and who is awaiting
imposition or execution of a sentence . . . be detained . . .
.” On March 24, 2017, Defendant filed his Motion.
Defendant argues that he should be released because (i)
Defendant's performance while under pretrial supervision
for thirteen (13) months was “exemplary;” (ii)
Defendant has strong ties to the community, including being
married and living in Georgia his entire life; and (iii)
Defendant has medical issues that are difficult to treat
while incarcerated, including psychiatric care, and for his
sickle cell disease. (Mot.).
April 3, 2017, the Government filed its response in
opposition to the Motion  (“Response”). The
Government argues that Defendant is a flight risk because (i)
of his psychiatric issues, (ii) he violated the conditions of
his release by consuming prescription medication at a lethal
quantity, and (iii) he may flee with unaccounted stolen funds
in the amount of $166, 960.00. (Resp.). The Government states
that Defendant should remain detained pending sentencing.
U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1) provides that
[A] judicial officer shall order that a person who has been
found guilty of an offense and who is awaiting imposition or
execution of sentence, other than a person for whom the
applicable guideline promulgated pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
[§] 994 does not recommend a term of imprisonment, be
detained, unless the judicial officer finds by clear and
convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or
pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the
community if released. . . . If the judicial officer makes
such a finding, such judicial officer shall order the release
of the person. . . .
18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1).
fails to provide any meaningful, and certainly no
“clear and convincing evidence” that he is not a
flight risk or danger to others. Defendant argues that his
performance while under pretrial supervision was
“exemplary, ” particularly because he had no new
arrests and he reported to his court dates as ordered.
Defendant states that his marriage and life-long citizenship
of Georgia also show that he has strong ties to the
community. The Government argues that Defendant's
February 10, 2017, episode using Valium, is evidence that
Defendant “is not willing to face the consequences of
his actions, ” and, thus, is a flight risk. (Resp. at
3). The Government argues further that the $166, 960.00 that
was not recovered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation may
be available to Defendant for use to flee before sentencing.
Court agrees that Defendant's psychiatric issues could
cause Defendant to flee to avoid sentencing and that he may
have access to funds stolen from the credit union. The Court
is not persuaded, and Defendant has not presented
“clear and convincing evidence” to show, that the
presumption of detention is rebutted and the evidence is
further that he is a risk of flight. Defendant's Motion
is denied on this ground.
additionally argues that he should be released to receive
appropriate medical treatment for his psychological issues
and his sickle cell disease. The Government responded that
the United States Marshals Service has a medical staff
“that is fully capable of addressing the needs of
inmates with psychological issues and sickle cell
conditions.” (Resp. at 4). Moreover, “[i]f the
doctors at Defendant's facility determine that Defendant
needs an outside consult for sickle cell, the U.S. Marshal