United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Columbus Division
D. LAND CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
pending before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss
Plaintiff Loretta Wright's amended complaint. For the
reasons set forth below, the motion (ECF No. 34) is granted.
TO DISMISS STANDARD
survive a motion to dismiss” under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). The complaint must include sufficient factual
allegations “to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
In other words, the factual allegations must “raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence
of” the plaintiff's claims. Id. at 556.
“Rule 12(b)(6) does not permit dismissal of a
well-pleaded complaint simply because ‘it strikes a
savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is
improbable.'” Watts v. Fla. Int'l
Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In ruling on a motion to
dismiss, the Court may consider exhibits attached to the
complaint. Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Florida, Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 1997) (per
who is proceeding pro se, filed a complaint that
failed to articulate a short and plain statement of her
claims as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(2). The Court permitted Wright to file an amended
complaint, and the Court instructed Wright that the amended
complaint must set forth “exactly what claims Wright is
pursuing” and “basic factual allegations that
support each claim.” Order 3, Jan. 5, 2017, ECF No. 25.
Wright filed an amended complaint, but she still has not
clearly articulated the factual bases for her claims.
Defendants seek dismissal of the amended complaint.
contends that she was injured because of the actions of
Defendants Bank of America and Deutsche Bank National Trust
Company. Am. Compl. 4, ECF No. 32. Based on the amended
complaint and its attachments, Wright alleges that she
executed a security deed on certain real property as security
for a loan from the Secretary of Veterans Affairs. Am. Compl.
Ex C, Security Deed, ECF No. 32-3. The security deed was
transferred to Deutsche Bank, and Bank of America serviced
the loan. Wright appears to acknowledge that she fell behind
on her loan payments, and she alleges that Bank of America
refused “all reasonable offers on numerous occasions in
any amount to bring current any deficiency.” Am. Compl.
¶ 4(3)). She did not allege any specific facts about the
deficiencies or her efforts to cure them.
2014, the property was sold in a non-judicial foreclosure
proceeding. Id. ¶ 4(1); Am. Compl. Ex. B, Deed
Under Power, ECF No. 32-2. Wright did not allege any specific
facts about the non-judicial foreclosure proceeding. And in
2016, Wright was evicted from the property. Am. Compl. Ex. A,
Writ of Possession & Judgment, ECF No. 32-1. Wright did
not allege any specific facts about the events giving rise to
appears to be attempting to raise seven claims. The Court
will address each one in turn.
Wright tries to assert a claim against Defendants based on
the non-judicial foreclosure process, which Wright alleges
“violates the Constitution.” Am. Compl. ¶
4(1). Wright did not allege any facts regarding the
non-judicial foreclosure proceeding in her case, and she did
not state how it violated the Constitution. In addition,
Wright did not allege any facts to suggest that Defendants
were state actors who can be subject to such constitutional
claims. For these reasons, Wright's constitutional claim
based on the non-judicial foreclosure process fails.
Wright summarily alleges that the Security Deed violates her
“civil rights under the Civil Rights Act of
1964.” Am. Compl. ¶ 4(2). In general, the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on
protected characteristics, such as race, in several contexts.
See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L.
88-352, 78 Stat. 241. Wright did not make any factual
allegations in support of this “civil rights”
claim, and the claim fails for that reason.
Wright alleges that the Security Deed “constitute[s] an
adhesion contract, ” Am. Compl. ¶ 5, although she
also asserts that she did not have a contract with either
Defendant, id. ¶ 6. Wright did not allege any
other facts on this point, and it is not clear what relief
she is seeking based on this allegation. “And, in any
event, the fact that a contract is adhesive does not,
standing alone, render the contract unenforceable.”
Realty Lenders, Inc. v. Levine, 649 S.E.2d 333, 336
(Ga.Ct.App. 2007). For these reasons, any claim based on the
allegedly adhesive nature of the Security Deed fails.
Wright claims that Bank of America violated the terms of the
Security Deed “by refusing all reasonable offers on
numerous occasions in any amount to bring current any
deficiency.” Am. Compl. ¶ 4(3). Wright did not
point to any specific provisions of the Security Deed that
were allegedly violated. The Court notes that under the
Security Deed, a default occurs if there is a payment
deficiency unless that deficiency is “made good”
before the due date of the next payment. Security Deed 2
¶ 2. Wright appears to acknowledge that there was a
deficiency on her account, but she did not allege that any
deficiency was “made ...