United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division
OPINION AND ORDER
WILLIAM S. DUFFEY, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on Defendant Olu Kanni
Sanyaolu's (“Defendant”) Motion in
Limine to Exclude Fingerprint Evidence and for a
Daubert Hearing  (“Motion”).
April 12, 2016, a grand jury in the Northern District of
Georgia returned a three-count Indictment  against
Defendant, charging Defendant, in Count One, with knowingly
procuring, contrary to law, naturalization and citizenship in
the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a).
The Government later dismissed Counts Two and Three. (,
about April 8, 1998, Defendant, who is a native of Nigeria,
was granted asylum in the United States. In 2009, Defendant
petitioned for citizenship through naturalization, and, on or
about July 20, 2009, citizenship was granted. In March 2014,
Defendant traveled to Nigeria. On his way back, on April 21,
2014, Defendant arrived at the Houston International Airport.
In the Customs inspections area, an Automated Fingerprint
Identification System (“AFIS”) fingerprint
examination of Defendant determined that he was linked to two
fingerprint identification numbers-one for him, and another
for Kunle Olukanni. The Olukanni immigration file shows that,
in 1992, Mr. Olukanni applied for asylum in New York, which
was denied in September 1994. Mr. Olukanni's wife then
petitioned for adjustment of his status, and Mr. Olukanni
filed a concurrent application to register permanent
residence or to adjust status. The applications also did not
result in a grant of lawful immigration. As a result, on July
23, 1998, Mr. Olukanni was ordered to be deported from the
17, 2015, Homeland Security Fingerprint Specialist Dean Roan
issued a laboratory report regarding comparisons of
fingerprint cards submitted by Defendant and those submitted
by Mr. Olukanni. Mr. Roan determined that the fingerprint
impressions on the cards were made by the same person. Mr.
Roan's one-page report does not describe the methodology
that he used to reach his conclusion that the
“fingerprint impressions . . . were made by one and the
same person.” ([49.1]).
January 9, 2017, Defendant filed his Motion, seeking to
exclude the presentation of Mr. Roan's fingerprint
evidence or, in the alternative, for a
Daubert hearing prior to trial to determine
admissibility of the fingerprint evidence. Defendant argues
that he has received no evidence beyond Mr. Roan's
one-page report regarding the fingerprint comparisons at
issue in this case, and that this information is insufficient
to meet the admissibility standards set forth in the Federal
Rules of Evidence and in Daubert.
response , the Government includes Mr. Roan's CV, and
also presents a summary of Mr. Roan's experience and his
expected testimony. The Government represents that, before
testifying about the particular fingerprints at issue in this
case, Mr. Roan will provide an overview regarding the
characteristics of fingerprints, how fingerprint exemplars
may be obtained, and the methodology that he follows to
conduct analysis of fingerprint samples. In particular, Mr.
Roan is expected to testify regarding the ACE-V methodology
for comparing fingerprint samples. Mr. Roan will then
describe the fingerprint cards from Defendant and Mr.
Olukanni, the methodology of comparison that he used to
analyze these fingerprint cards, and his conclusions
regarding the fingerprint impressions on the
the Federal Rules of Evidence, expert testimony is admissible
if: (1) the expert is qualified to testify regarding the
subject matter of her testimony; (2) the methodology that the
expert used to reach his or her conclusions is sufficiently
reliable; and (3) the expert's testimony will assist the
trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining
a fact at issue. United States v. Scott,
403 F.App'x 392, 397 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing United
States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004))
(en banc); Fed.R.Evid. 702. The Government has the burden to
meet each of the requirements of admissibility. See
Scott, 403 F.App'x at 397-98.
second prong requires the district court to make a
preliminary determination whether the expert's
methodology is reliable. Scott, 403 F.App'x at
397. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 113 (1993), the Supreme Court ...