United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division
OPINION AND ORDER
WILLIAM S. DLTFEY, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter is before the Court on Magistrate Judge Walter E.
Johnson's Final Report and Recommendation 
(“R&R”). The R&R recommends the Court
grant Defendant RoBal, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss . Also
before the Court are Plaintiff Stephanie LaFollette's
(“Plaintiff”) Objections to the R&R .
about November 2015, Plaintiff applied for employment with
Defendant. (Compl. ¶ 14). As part of that application,
Plaintiff completed Defendant's “Employee Applicant
Background Check Authorization/Order Form” (the
“Form”). (Compl. ¶ 15; see also
Compl. Ex. D [1.4] (copy of Form)). The Form states that
“[t]he undersigned (i) confirms that it [sic] has
authorized the above named Client to obtain a background
check for employment purposes including, without limitation,
a consumer report and criminal background check on the
undersigned.” (Compl. ¶ 16). The Form also states
in a separate paragraph the following:
THE UNDERSIGNED RELEASES AND HOLDS HARMLESS
INFORMATION ON DEMAND, INC. AND ITS AGENTS AND
REPRESENTATIVES, AND ALL ENTITITES AND INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED
IN REPORTING INFORMATION ABOUT THE UNDERSIGNED, FROM ANY AND
ALL CLAIMS BY, OR LIABILITY TO, THE UNDERSIGNED THAT MAY
RESULT FROM, ARISE OUT OF, OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE CHECK
AND CONSENTS TO THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYER TO [SIC] PERFORM
PERIODIC BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR THE DURATION OF MY EMPLOYMENT
WITH THIS COMPANY.
(Compl. ¶ 17 (capital letters and bold in original)).
Form states that defendant certifies that it “has
provided to the subject of the Background Report a clear and
conspicuous written disclosure, in a document that consists
solely of the disclosure, that a consumer report may be
obtained for employment purposes.” (Compl. ¶ 18).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant never provided her with a
document that consists solely of the disclosure that it may
obtain a consumer report for employment purposes. (Compl.
¶ 19). On November 25, 2015, Defendant obtained
Plaintiff's consumer report from a consumer reporting
agency called Information on Demand. (Compl. ¶ 20).
18, 2016, Plaintiff filed her Complaint on behalf of herself
and a putative class, asserting that Defendant violated the
Fair Credit Reporting Act's (“FCRA”)
“stand-alone disclosure requirement, ” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681b(b)(2)(A). Plaintiff does not claim that she or
the putative class suffered any actual damages, but seeks
instead statutory damages, costs, and attorneys' fees.
(Compl. ¶¶ 37-38). On September 28, 2016, Defendant
filed its Motion to Dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff lacks
standing to sue under the Supreme Court's decision in
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540 (2016).
November 21, 2016, the Magistrate Judge issued his R&R.
The Magistrate Judge found that the weight of authority holds
that a plaintiff who receives the disclosure required under
the FCRA, but not in the format required by the FCRA, has not
suffered a sufficiently concrete injury to have Article III
December 9, 2016, Plaintiff filed her Objections to the
R&R. Plaintiff argues that Spokeo did not alter
standing jurisprudence, and that the Magistrate Judge erred
in finding that a plaintiff who receives the disclosure
required under the FCRA, but not in the format required by
the FCRA, has not suffered a sufficiently concrete injury to
have Article III standing.
Review of a Magistrate Judge's Report and
conducting a careful and complete review of the findings and
recommendations, a district judge may accept, reject, or
modify a magistrate judge's report and recommendation. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Williams v. Wainwright, 681
F.2d 732, 732 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). A district judge
“shall make a de novo determination of those portions
of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1). Where no party has objected to the report
and recommendation, the Court conducts only a plain error
review of the ...