United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division
BENA V. SIMON and GEORGE V. SIMON, Plaintiffs,
ELSIE AMAECHI, Defendant. v.
OPINION AND ORDER
WILLIAM S. DUFFEY, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter is before the Court on Defendant Elsie Amaechi's
(“Defendant”) Objections [7, 8] to Magistrate
Judge Justin S. Anand's Final Report and Recommendation
(“R&R”) , which recommends remanding this
dispossessory action to the Magistrate Court of Gwinnett
County, Georgia. Also before the Court is Plaintiff Bena V.
Simon's and George V. Simon's
(“Plaintiffs”) Motion to Remand .
proceeding pro se, has a lengthy litigation history
involving attempts to delay foreclosure and dispossessory
actions on other properties.
February 2, 2017, Plaintiffs initiated a dispossessory
proceeding against Defendant in the Magistrate Court of
Gwinnett County, Georgia. (See [1.1] at 6). The
Complaint asserts that Defendant is a tenant at sufferance
following a foreclosure sale of the Property and seeks
possession of premises currently occupied by
February 13, 2017, Defendant filed her Dispossessory Answer
in state court and asserted a counterclaim against Plaintiffs
for “wrongfully file [sic] desposery [sic], ”
failure to repair requested repairs, fraud, harassment, and
discrimination. (See [1.1] at 7). Defendant,
apparently in response to Plaintiffs' Complaint, also
filed a document in state court asserting that she made
substantial improvements to the Property after discovering
that the Property “need[ed] lots of repairs, ”
(see [1.1] at 3), that she informed Plaintiffs of
the Property “damages and repairs” but they never
“did a single repair . . . or [pay] the bank”
and continued to “collect [her] money, ” that
she intended to buy the Property through a lease-to-own
agreement, and that she helped Plaintiffs “stop the
foreclosure” by hiring an attorney and by paying court
fees to avoid foreclosure, but that Plaintiffs acted in
“bad faith” and the Property was now in
foreclosure. (Id. at 3-4).
February 13, 2017, Defendant removed the Gwinnett County
Action to this Court by filing her Notice of Removal and an
application to proceed in forma pauperis
(“IFP”) . Defendant appears to assert that
there is federal subject matter jurisdiction because there is
a question of federal law in this action. Defendant does not
claim removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1443 or assert any
violations of her federal civil rights. Defendant instead
appears to assert counterclaims against Plaintiffs for not
“do[ing] any repairs” to the Property, fraud, and
harassment. (See Notice of Removal [1.1] at 1-2).
February 14, 2017, Magistrate Judge Anand granted
Defendant's application to proceed IFP. The Magistrate
Judge then considered, sua sponte, whether there is
federal subject matter jurisdiction. The Court found that
federal subject matter jurisdiction was not present and
recommended that the Court remand the case to the Magistrate
Court of Gwinnett County. The Magistrate Judge found that the
Complaint filed in Magistrate Court asserts a state court
dispossessory action and does not allege federal law claims.
Because a federal law defense or counterclaim does not confer
federal jurisdiction, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the
Court does not have federal question jurisdiction over this
matter. Although not alleged in her Notice of Removal, the
Magistrate Judge also considered whether the Court has
subject-matter jurisdiction based on diversity of
citizenship. The Magistrate Judge found that Defendant failed
to allege any facts to show that the parties' citizenship
is completely diverse, or that the amount in controversy
exceeds $75, 000. The Magistrate Judge concluded that the
Court does not have diversity jurisdiction over this matter
and that this case is required to be remanded to the state
February 27, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Remand to
March 14, 2017, Defendant filed her “Motion for
Interlockutory [sic] Injunction”  and “Answer
to Written Objection” , which the Court construes as
her Objections to the R&R.
conducting a careful and complete review of the findings and
recommendations, a district judge may accept, reject, or
modify a magistrate judge's report and recommendation. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Williams v. Wainwright, 681
F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1112 (1983). A district judge “shall make a de
novo determination of those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations to which
objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). With
respect to those findings and recommendations to which
objections have not been asserted, the Court must conduct a
plain error review of the record. United States v.
Slay, 714 F.2d 1093, 1095 (11th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1050 (1984).
Objections are largely incomprehensible, frivolous and
conclusory. In them, Defendant reasserts generally that she
has “spent lots of money in repairing” the
Property, that she “owe[d] no money when dispossession
[sic] was filed against [her], ” and that the Court has
“probable jurisdiction in this case.”
(See  at 1; see also  at 1-2). Even
though Defendant's “objections” to the