United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Savannah Division
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Williams, currently incarcerated at Georgia State Prison in
Reidsville, Georgia, once again (for at least the
twelfth time) asks for habeas relief on his state
criminal conviction despite the Court's unambiguous
warning that further requests for recalculation of his
sentence would expose him to further sanctions. See
Williams v. Allen, No. CV416-324, doc. 5 (imposing $500
sanction after petitioner filed an eleventh petition
for habeas relief, despite prior warnings). Yet again, the
Court notes that:
Petitioner has wasted this Court's resources several
times through the years with unmeritorious (and unauthorized)
successive attempts at habeas relief from his state court
conviction and sentence. See Williams v. Owens, No.
412CV019 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 28, 2012) (R&R recommending
dismissal of his fifth § 2254 attempt). See
also Williams v. State Board of Pardon and Paroles, No.
408CV105 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 19, 2008); Williams v.
Barrow, No. 405CV167 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 24, 2005);
Williams v. Johnson, No. 403CV069 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 16,
2003); Williams v. Johnson, No. 402CV044 (S.D. Ga.
Mar. 14, 2002); Williams v. Smith, No. 495CV176
(S.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 1995). And that is just in the Southern
District of Georgia.
Byson, No. CV416-232, doc. 6 at n. 1; see also
Williams v. Toole, CV414-088 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 7, 2015)
(denying his seventh § 2254 petition on the
merits). Yet, petitioner returns again
without authorization from the Eleventh Circuit and
"[w]ithout so much as a hint that he has run his 28
U.S.C. § 2254 claims through this Court [nine]
times before, " to challenge the calculation and
application of his state sentence. CV412-019, doc. 4 at 1.
a second or successive application permitted by this section
is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in
the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the
district court to consider the application." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b)(3)(A). Because Williams sought no such
permission, this Court "is not at liberty to
consider" his ninth § 2254 petition.
Smalls v. St. Lawrence, 2012 WL 1119766 at * 1 (S.D.
Ga. Feb. 27, 2012). Accordingly, his unauthorized successive
§ 2254 petition, which is otherwise meritless, should be
DISMISSED. And, pursuant to the Court's prior
Orders in CV416-324 (doc. 5) and CV416-232 (doc. 6), his
motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is
DENIED. Williams is ORDERED to pay the $5 filing fee within
14 days of this Order.
"continuing to raise a claim that he is statutorily
prohibited from pursuing" - conduct that the Court
repeatedly cautioned him would be considered "vexatious
litigation that warrant[s] some type of sanction, "
see, e.g., CV 416-324, doc. 5 at 5-6; CV416-232,
doc. 6 at 5 -Williams has again crossed the sanctions line.
Given the persistence of his abuse, undeterred even in the
face of the Court's repeated warnings and recommendation
of a $500 sanction (to be collected from his prison account),
the time has come to manage an inmate who won't manage
himself. In that regard, the Court recognizes that
"[a]ccess to the courts is unquestionably a right of
considerable constitutional significance, " but it
"'is neither absolute nor unconditional.'"
Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1096 (11th Cir.
2008) (quoting Cofield v. Ala. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 936 F.2d 512, 516 (11th Cir. 1991)).
Sometimes, "[conditions and restrictions on [a]
person's access are necessary to preserve the judicial
resource for all other persons." Id.
"Frivolous and vexatious law suits, " like those
continually pressed by Williams, "threaten the
availability of a well-functioning judiciary to all
the Court recommends that the following restrictions be
imposed upon petitioner:
to any future civil actions sought to be commenced in
forma pauperis (IFP) by petitioner, the Clerk be
DIRECTED to receive the papers, open a single
miscellaneous file for tracking purposes, and forward them to
the presiding judge for a determination as to whether
petitioner qualifies for IFP status and whether he has stated
a habeas claim with any arguable merit. Only if the pleading
alleges a plausible claim for relief will the Court allow it
to be filed. IFP petitions that fail to pass muster shall be
DISMISSED without any further judicial action after THIRTY
(30) DAYS from the date the Clerk receives the petition,
unless the Court orders otherwise. This automatic dismissal
of insubstantial claims "will reduce the burden of
paper-moving and explanation-writing, conserving a little
judicial time for litigants who deserve
attention." Thus, although the Court will read and
consider any future IFP application and petition that
Williams endeavors to file, it will not necessarily enter an
order addressing the IFP application or petition. If no order
is forthcoming, then THIRTY (30) DAYS after the
petition's receipt the Clerk shall, without awaiting any
further direction, notify Williams that his case has been
dismissed per the form attached as an appendix to this
Clerk shall not docket any further petitions, motions or
papers in this case. The Clerk also shall not docket any
further petitions, motions or papers in a case automatically
dismissed pursuant to the directive above -- except for a
notice of appeal. Any papers other than a notice of appeal
shall be returned to petitioner unfiled. If he files a notice
of appeal, the Clerk shall forward a copy of this Order, the
notice of appeal, and the dismissed petition to the Court of
Appeals. Petitioner shall remain responsible for appellate
filing fees or he may move this Court to grant IFP status on
ensure that all future pleadings filed by Williams are
properly consolidated for review, the Clerk shall personally
advise each deputy clerk of the Court's ruling in this
case and develop a procedure for ensuring that all future
complaints filed by Williams are immediately assigned and
forwarded to the presiding district judge in this case,
regardless of which divisional clerk's office receives
and dockets the papers.
Petitioner may file a motion to modify or rescind the
imposition of these restrictions NO EARLIER THAN ONE (1) YEAR
from the date of this Order.
copy of this R&R shall be forwarded to each judicial
officer in this district.
the Certificate of Appealability (COA) standards set forth in
Brown v. United States, 2009 WL 307872 at * 1-2
(S.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2009), the Court discerns no COA-worthy
issues at this stage of the litigation, so no COA should
issue either. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); Rule 11(a) of the
Rules Governing § 2254 Cases ("The district court
must issue or deny a certificate of appealability
when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant")
(emphasis added). And, as there are no non-frivolous issues
to raise on appeal, an appeal would not be taken in good
faith. Thus, in forma pauperis status on appeal
should likewise be DENIED. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
R&R is submitted to the district judge assigned to this
action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and this
Court's Local Rule 72.3. Within 14 days of service, any
party may file written objections to this R&R with the
Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be
captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Report
and Recommendations." Any request for additional time to
file objections should be filed with the Clerk for
consideration by the assigned district judge.
the objections period has ended, the Clerk shall submit this
R&R together with any objections to the assigned district
judge. The district judge will review the magistrate
judge's findings and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to
timely file objections will result in the waiver of rights on
appeal. 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Symonett v. V.A. Leasing