United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division
OPINION AND ORDER
WILLIAM S. DUFFEY, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court pursuant to the 18 U.S.C. §
3142(f) detention hearing held on March 21, 2017.
Background and Procedural History
December 7, 2015, Defendant Pamela Mozee
(“Defendant”) pleaded not guilty to an
eight-count indictment alleging that she mailed oxycodone and
hydrocodone on four different dates, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841 and 843. The Government asserts that
the evidence will show that, around 2013 and 2014, Defendant
mailed over sixty (60) packages of oxycodone or hydrocodone
to an individual in Alaska, in exchange for approximately
$100, 368. The Government claims Defendant obtained the
controlled substances both from prescriptions she received
from doctors and from street dealers. (See March 21,
2017, Detention Hr'g Tr. (“Tr.”)).
December 7, 2015, Magistrate Judge Gerrilyn G. Brill issued
an order setting the conditions of Defendant's release
pending trial. (). The conditions required, among other
things, that Defendant (1) participate in a program of
inpatient or outpatient substance abuse therapy and
counseling if directed by the pretrial services office or
supervising officer, (2) submit to mental health evaluations,
and (3) participate in mental health treatment or counseling
if recommended by pretrial services officers. (Id.).
August 24, 2016, Defendant's counsel filed a
“Notice Regarding Competency” , stating that
a preliminary evaluation by psychiatrist Dr. Julie Rand
Dorney indicated that Defendant is not competent to stand
trial. On September 9, 2016, the Court held a competency
hearing. Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the
Court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
Defendant was “presently suffering from a mental
disease or defect rendering her unable to assist properly in
her defense.” (September 9, 2016, Order 
(“September 9th Order”)). The Court, adopting the
requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d), ordered that
Defendant be remanded to the custody of the Attorney General
to undergo a mental evaluation. The Order stated:
[T]he Court commits the defendant to the custody of the
Attorney General for placement in a suitable facility . . .
(1) for a period, not to exceed four months, to determine
whether there is a substantial probability that in the
foreseeable future she will attain the capacity to permit the
proceedings to go forward; and (2) for an additional
reasonable period of time until (A) her mental condition is
so improved that the trial may proceed, if the Court finds
that there is a substantial probability that within such
additional period of time she will attain the capacity to
permit the proceedings to go forward; or (b) the pending
charges against her are disposed of according to law;
whichever is earlier.
(September 9th Order at 1-2) (emphasis added).
November 9, 2016, Defendant arrived at Federal Medical Center
Carswell (“FMC Carswell”) in Fort Worth, Texas,
for her evaluation. On March 3, 2017, Defendant's counsel
notified the Court that Defendant will have been in FMC
Carswell for four months as of March 9, 2017.
4241(d)(1)(A) provides that a court may extend the four-month
period for an additional reasonable period of time “if
the court finds that there is a substantial probability that
within such additional period of time [s]he will attain the
capacity to permit the proceedings to go forward.” 18
U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1)(A). Because the Court was not
provided sufficient information to determine under Section
4241(d)(1)(A) that it may extend the time for the Attorney
General to maintain custody of Defendant, on March 7, 2017,
the Court issued its order for the Government to show cause
why Defendant should not be ordered released from the custody
of the Attorney General. On March 9, 2017, one of
Defendant's psychologists at FMC Carswell, Doctor Amor A.
Correa, sent the Court a letter stating that Defendant
suffers from schizophrenia, and that she will likely remain
not competent to stand trial without receiving psychotropic
medication, which she is unwilling to accept voluntarily.
(Ex. 2). The letter stated that Defendant does not presently
represent a danger to herself or others in the institution,
and she thus cannot be forcibly medicated. The letter
requests the Court decide, under Sell v. United
States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003), whether Defendant can be
forcibly medicated to render her competent.
March 9, 2017, the Court held a teleconference, during which
the Court determined that the Government failed to provide
sufficient evidence to allow the Court to extend the
four-month commitment period under Section 4241(d)(1)(A),
that Defendant should be transferred to Atlanta, and that the
Court would hold both a detention hearing and a hearing
pursuant to Sell. On March 10, 2017, the Court
issued its Order  releasing Defendant from the
commitment, requiring the United States Marshals Service to
return Defendant to Atlanta, and requiring that Defendant be
detained in an appropriate facility pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(e) pending a Section 3142(f)
March 21, 2017, the Court held a hearing, pursuant to Section
3142(f), regarding Defendant's detention. The hearing was
held to determine whether, given the information provided to
the Court regarding Defendant's mental condition,
Defendant constitutes a danger to certain individuals or the
community and whether she poses a flight risk, such that
continued pre-trial detention is appropriate. Defendant was
present at the hearing. A significant focus of the hearing was
on whether Defendant, prior to her commitment, complied with
the terms of her pre-trial release and her current capacity
to control her conduct without her medication.
Hearing Evidence and Testimony
counsel argued that, prior to Defendant's commitment, she
complied with the terms of release by, among other things,
making all required court appearances, meeting with probation
officers, not committing any crimes, and meeting with her
licensed counselor. (See Tr. 12). Defendant's
counsel explained that Defendant was late for only one
hearing, which was due to transportation issues. (Tr. 11).
Defendant's counsel also represents that Defendant's
family has offered their support for Defendant, and that they
will encourage her to abide by the terms of her release and
to take her medication. (See Tr. 57-58).
Defendant's counsel represents that Defendant's home
remains available to her. Defendant's counsel, and
Defendant herself, also represent that Defendant will now
take her medication. (Tr. 58).
Government argued generally that Defendant's mental
condition and behavior have worsened and that she thus poses
a threat to others or the community and that she is a flight
risk. In support of its argument, the Government presented
several exhibits. The Government's Exhibit 1 is an August
27, 2016, letter from Dr. Dorney to Defendant's counsel,
in which Dr. Dorney opines regarding delusions Defendant
suffers, which include delusions related to government
investigators involved in her current offense. Exhibit 2 is
the March 9, 2017, letter from Dr. Correa to the Court
described above. Exhibit 3 is a letter from Defendant to the
Court, in which Defendant derogatorily characterizes her
probation officer, Dennis Tudor. (Ex. 3 at 1). Exhibit 4 is a
message, dated December 9, 2016, written by Defendant in
which she accuses her counsel of being an “abusive lier
[sic], ” and “the devil, ” among other
accusations. (Ex. 4 at 1). Defendant also stated that she
believes her counsel and his investigator “tried to
kill me on August 4, 2016.” (Id. at 3).
Exhibit 5 is Dr. Correa's March 21, 2017, final
evaluation of Defendant, in which Dr. Correa described
Defendant's delusions, which included that the nurses at
FMC Carswell kill people and that her attorney
“kidnapped” her to FMC Carswell in a conspiracy
with postal inspectors, investigators, and probation officers
who have sexually assaulted her and attempted to kill her.
(Ex. 5 at 8, 11). The Dr. Correa opines that Defendant
suffers from schizophrenia, currently in acute episode.
(Id. at 10). She concludes that Defendant is
unlikely to become competent to stand trial in the
foreseeable future without psychiatric medication.
(Id. at 11). The Government argues that
Defendant's fear of the proceedings and individuals
involved in them show she could fail to appear at trial.
(See Tr. 27-28).
Government also called two witnesses, Tammie Boone and Dennis
Tudor. Ms. Boone and Mr. Tudor were formerly Defendant's
probation officers. Ms. Boone testified that she received the
case on transfer from Mr. Tudor. (Tr. 33). She visited
Defendant twice, once successfully and the other
unsuccessfully. (Tr. 33). During her successful visit on July 13,
2016, Defendant was upset and made several allegations toward
individuals involved in her case, including agents, the
inspector, and Mr. Tudor. (Tr. 33-34). She testified that,
though Defendant made bizarre allegations, Defendant never
threatened her or other probation officers. (Tr. 36). She
testified that, over time, the allegations against her became
more “intense, ” and that, after Defendant
accused her and Mr. Tudor of “pulling a gun on
[Defendant], ” Ms. Boone was instructed by her
supervisor to cease contact with Defendant. (Tr. 37). Ms.
Boone testified that she felt Defendant's conduct was
“growing and increasing to the point that concerned me
for my safety.” (Tr. 38).
Tudor was Defendant's probation officer from January 8,
2016, through June 30, 2016. (Tr. 39). He testified that
Defendant was generally cooperative during his visits with
her. (Tr. 41). He related that he found out from a prior
officer that Defendant had brass knuckles in her home, and
that, after speaking with her and her attorney, the brass
knuckles were removed from her home by Defendant. (Tr. 42).
He testified that Defendant never threatened him with the
brass knuckles. (Tr. 42). Mr. Tudor also testified that,
after his visits, Defendant often sent him e-mails or text
messages containing various allegations, including that he
had had inappropriate contact with Defendant. (Tr. 42-43).
Because of these allegations, Mr. Tudor began taking another
officer with him during his visits. (Tr. 42). Because of
Defendant's accusations and her ...