United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division
OPINION AND ORDER
WILLIAM S. DUFFEY, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Lorna Nembhard's
(“Plaintiff”) “Emergency Injunction to Halt
Wrongful Foreclosure and Request to Produce Original Note,
with Mortgage Schedules, Warranty Deed, Land Titles With All
Endorsements from Level III Audit, ” contained in her
November 29, 1996, Plaintiff obtained a loan in the amount of
$68, 967.00 from Fidelity National Mortgage Corporation
(“Fidelity National”). (Security Deed [1.4] at
2). Repayment of the loan was secured by a deed
(“Security Deed”) to real property located at
6422 Wedgeview Drive, Tucker, Georgia (the
“Property”). (Id.). Under the terms of
the Security Deed, Plaintiff “grant[ed] and convey[ed]
to [Fidelity National] and [Fidelity National's]
successors and assigns, with power of sale, the
14, 2016, Fidelity National assigned its rights under the
Security Deed to Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation
(“Chase Manhattan”).(Assignment [1.2]).
point, it appears that Plaintiff defaulted on her loan
March 1, 2017, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed
her Complaint, asserting claims for “[c]ommon law
mortgage fraud, ” (Count 1), Lack of Standing (Count 2),
“[v]iolations to [sic] Federal and State Laws”
(Count 3), and “fraudulent practices” (Count 4).
Plaintiff also appears to assert claims for violation of the
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”)
and violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.
The crux of Plaintiff's claims is that Defendants
JPMorgan Chase Bank National (“JPMorgan”) and
Barrett Daffin Frappier Levine & Block, LLP (together,
“Defendants”) lack standing to foreclose on the
property based on perceived defects in the assignment and the
transfer of her mortgage. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief,
compensatory and punitive damages, attorney's fees and
litigation costs. Plaintiff also seeks a declaration that
“Plaintiffs [sic] have the right to not be given
misleading and fraudulent information from JPMorgan Chase
Bank claiming to have authority in servicing rights.”
(Compl. at 37).
Complaint also appears to include a request for preliminary
injunctive relief, “to halt all commencing actions
executed outside the statutes and Rule of Law [sic] that
deprives Plaintiff of a State liberty interest regarding
wrongful foreclosure injuriously instituted [sic] . . .
.” (Compl. at 10-11).
Legal Standard for Preliminary Injunctive Relief
eligible for a temporary restraining order
(“TRO”) or preliminary injunctive relief under
Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a movant
must show: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits; (2) that irreparable injury will be suffered if the
relief is not granted; (3) that the threatened injury
outweighs the harm the relief would inflict on the
non-movant; and (4) that entry of the relief would serve the
public interest. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v.
Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225-26 (11th Cir. 2005);
Parker v. State Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 275 F.3d
1032, 1034-35 (11th Cir. 2001).
injunctive relief is a drastic and extraordinary remedy which
should not be granted unless the movant can clearly establish
each of the four elements. Four Seasons Hotels and
Resorts v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 320 F.3d 1205, 1210
(11th Cir. 2003).
elements for a TRO are essentially the same as for a
preliminary injunction, except that “[t]he motion must
be supported by allegations ... that such [irreparable]
injury is so imminent that notice and hearing would be
impractical if not impossible.” Hernandez v. Board
of Regents, 1997 WL 391800, *1 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (quoting
Chase Manhattan Bank v. Dime Savings Bank of New
York, 961 F.Supp. 275, 276 (M.D. Fla. 1997)).
Fundamentally, TROs are “designed to preserve the
status quo until there is an opportunity to hold a ...