United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Macon Division
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
STEPHEN HYLES, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
pending before the court is Defendant Davis's motion for
summary judgment (ECF No. 60), Defendants Reece, Harmond,
Nation, and Barnes's motion for summary judgment (ECF No.
66), and Defendants Fair, James, Street, and Digby's
motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 69). Plaintiff responded
to each motion (ECF Nos. 71, 73, 79). For the reasons
explained below, it is recommended that Defendants'
motions be granted.
present action arises out of an alleged denial of appropriate
medical treatment at the Bibb, Jones, and Crisp County Jails
(respectively the “BCJ, ” “JCJ, ” and
“CCJ”). Following Plaintiff's arrest on
December 3, 2013, he was incarcerated at the BCJ. Plaintiff
allegedly informed Defendant BCJ Nurses Street, Fair, James,
and Digsby that he was an insulin-dependent diabetic and
advised them of the specific type and dosage of insulin
required to control his diabetes. Plaintiff complains that
these Defendants nevertheless changed his insulin
prescription and that this change caused damage to his
health. According to Plaintiff, the Defendant Nurses were
“following policy at the jail, ” and for this
reason, he includes Bibb County Sheriff David Davis as a
Defendant in this action.
March 23, 2014, Plaintiff was transferred to the JCJ.
Plaintiff complains that JCJ “medical personnel”
failed to give him insulin for the first five days of his
stay and thereafter administered the insulin late or on an
inconsistent basis. Plaintiff further complains that
“medical personnel” denied him his required high
blood pressure medication. Plaintiff additionally sues Jones
County Sheriff Robert “Butch” Reece, alleging
that Reece denied Plaintiff medical treatment due to an
inadequate budget, that his unspecified
“policies” resulted in the violation of
Plaintiff's rights, and that he “failed to employ
qualified medical personnel to insure the proper care and
treatment of inmates.” Recast Compl. 7, ECF No. 5;
was transferred to the CJC on December 3, 2014. There is no
pending motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims
against the CJC defendants. In January 2015, Plaintiff was
transferred back to the BCJ for two weeks. He claims his
medical needs were ignored. Id. Thereafter,
Plaintiff was returned to the JCJ.
Summary Judgment Standard
judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In determining whether a genuine
dispute of material fact exists to defeat a motion
for summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in the light
most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment,
drawing all justifiable inferences in the opposing
party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). A fact is material if it
is relevant or necessary to the outcome of the suit.
Id. at 248. A factual dispute is genuine if
the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a
verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
prevail on a deliberate indifference to serious medical need
claim, [a plaintiff] must show: (1) a serious medical need;
(2) the defendants' deliberate indifference to that need;
and (3) causation between that indifference and the
plaintiff's injury.” Mann v. Taser
Int'l, 588 F.3d 1291, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2009).
“A serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed
by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so
obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor's attention.” Bingham v.
Thomas, 654 F.3d at 1176 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Deliberate indifference requires a showing
of a “subjective knowledge of a risk of serious
harm” and “disregard of that risk . . . by
conduct that is more than mere negligence.” Brown
v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1351 (11th Cir. 2004)
disagreement with the treatment received does not give rise
to a claim for deliberate indifference. See Hamm v.
Dekalb Cnty., 774 F.2d 1527, 1575 (11th Cir. 1985).
Specifically, “an inmate's desire for a different
mode of treatment does not rise to the level of deliberate
indifference.” Id. Negligence in treatment,
even rising to the level of medical malpractice, is not
deliberate indifference. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 106 (1976). Instead, the treatment must be “so
grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the
conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental
fairness.” Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495,
1505 (11th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). “[W]hether governmental actors should have
employed additional diagnostic techniques or forms of
treatment “is a classic example of a matter for medical
judgment” and therefore not an appropriate basis for
grounding liability under the Eighth Amendment. Adams v.
Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1544-46 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding
prison medical staff's alleged treatment of
prisoner's asthma with inadequate doses of oral steroids
and lack of diligence in pursuing alternative means of
treating prisoner's asthma was not “deliberate
indifference” to medical needs and did not violate
Defendants Fair, James, Street, and Digby's Motion for
Fair, James, Street, and Digby move for summary judgment,
asserting that the record is devoid of any evidence
suggesting Defendants were deliberately indifferent to any
serious medical need of Plaintiff. Defs. Br. in Supp. 4-6,
ECF No. 69-2. Plaintiff responds that Defendants were
deliberately indifferent by refusing ...