United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Statesboro Division
STAN BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
before the Court is inmate and non-party Waseem Daker's
(“Daker”) Motion for Intervention. (Doc. 41.)
Plaintiff filed this in forma pauperis action on
July 7, 2016, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1.)
After the Court conducted the requisite frivolity review,
Plaintiff was allowed to proceed with his due process claims
for injunctive relief and nominal damages. (Doc. 12.) On
February 7, 2017, Daker filed his Motion for Intervention.
(Doc. 41.) For the reasons which follow, the Court DENIES
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a non-party to
intervene in an ongoing action if certain conditions, laid
out by the Rule, are met. Fed.R.Civ.P. 24. Daker seeking to
intervene and become a party to this case is akin to multiple
prisoner-plaintiffs seeking to proceed in forma
pauperis (“IFP”) in the same cause of
action. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has considered
the issue of whether “the Prisoner Litigation Reform
Act [“PLRA”] permits multi-plaintiff [IFP] civil
actions.” Hubbard v. Haley, 262 F.3d 1194,
1196 (11th Cir. 2001). In Hubbard, the Court of
Appeals noted that “the intent of Congress in
promulgating the PLRA was to curtail abusive prisoner tort,
civil rights and conditions of confinement litigation.”
Id. (citing Anderson v. Singletary, 111
F.3d 801, 805 (11th Cir. 1997)).
interpreting the PLRA, the Eleventh Circuit upheld a district
court's dismissal of a multiple-prisoner/plaintiff
lawsuit wherein the plaintiffs sought to proceed in forma
pauperis together. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that
“the PLRA clearly and unambiguously requires that
‘if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal
[IFP], the prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount
of the filing fee.'” Id. at 1197 (citing
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)). Specifically, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the following procedure:
The district court never reached the merits of the case, but
instead dismissed the case, finding that each plaintiff had
to file a separate complaint and pay a separate filing fee.
To facilitate its ruling, the district court indicated that
it would open a new suit with a separate number in each of
the plaintiff's names and consider the original complaint
to be their complaints. The majority of the 18 plaintiffs had
already filed separate petitions to proceed IFP. The court
directed each of the remaining plaintiffs to file his own
form complaint and petition to proceed IFP. The court then
dismissed the original multi-plaintiff complaint without
Id. Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit determined that
“the plain language of the PLRA requires that each
prisoner proceeding IFP pay the full filing fee[.]”
is proceeding in forma pauperis in this action.
Allowing Daker to intervene in this action would circumvent
the Congressional purpose in promulgating the PLRA.
Id. at 1197- 98. That is, “[t]he modest
monetary outlay will force prisoners to think twice about the
case and not just file reflexively.” Id. at
1198 (quoting 141 Cong. Rec. S7526 (May 25, 1995) (statement
of Sen. Kyle)). Additionally, allowing Daker to intervene
would directly contradict the Eleventh Circuit's
conclusion that “the PLRA clearly and unambiguously
requires that ‘if a prisoner brings a civil action or
files an appeal [IFP], the prisoner shall be required to pay
the full amount of the filing fee.'” Id.
at 1197 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)); see also
Bowens v. Turner Guilford Knight Det., 510 F.
App'x 863 (11th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of
complaint under Hubbard, in which six inmates joined
claims in a single suit); Garcia v. McNeil, No.
4:07CV474-SPM/WCS, 2010 WL 4823370, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 12,
2010), report and recommendation adopted, No.
4:07-CV-474-SPM WCS, 2010 WL 4818067 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 22,
2010) (“Hubbard decided that since every
prisoner must pay a full filing fee, and since other
litigants who join together in one complaint pay only one
filing fee, prisoners cannot join under Rule 20. That means
that the prisoners here, who have a lawyer and who do not
pursue frivolous claims, cannot join under Rule 20 in light
of Hubbard-even if each of them pays [the filing
fee]. This court is bound by Hubbard.”).
Circuit law clearly prohibits multiple prisoner plaintiffs
from proceeding in forma pauperis in the same civil
action. Consequently, the Court DENIES Daker's
Motion for Intervention.
 Even if such clear precedent did not
exist, Daker would still be prohibited from proceeding. Daker
asserts that he has a “direct, substantial, legally
protectable interest in the proceedings” because he is
also an inmate in the Georgia Department of Correction's
Tier II program. (Doc. 41, p. 3.) This broad, conclusory
assertion is insufficient to meet the requirements set out by
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 24 for ...