United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Savannah Division
St. Joseph's / Candler Health System, Inc. removed this
employment discrimination (Title VII and § 1981) action
from state court. Doc. 1. It moved to strike matters in Naomi
Ellison's Complaint (allegations and an exhibit) that it
contends are immaterial, prejudicial, and barred from
publication. Doc. 6. Plaintiff amended her Complaint,
removing some of the challenged material,  see doc.
13 (Amended Complaint); doc. 14 at 2 (explaining amendment
removed allegations referring to EEOC conciliation), and
opposes the motion to strike the remaining matters. Doc. 14.
to strike allow a party to challenge "any redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous
matter." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f)(2).
"Rule 12(f) reflects the inherent power of the Court to
prune down pleadings so as to expedite the administration of
justice and to prevent abuse of its process."
TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Zip Wireless Prods.,
Inc., 716 F.Supp.2d 1275, 1290 (N.D.Ga. 2010) (citing
McNair v. Monsanto Co., 279 F.Supp.2d 1290, 1298
(M.D. Ga. 2003)). The Court should only exercise this
discretion if "the matter sought to be omitted has no
possible relationship to the controversy, may confuse the
issues, or otherwise prejudice a party." Nankivil v.
Lockheed Martin Corp., 216 F.R.D. 689, 691 (M.D. Fla.
2003) (internal quotation omitted). This is not a high bar to
Frazier v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 2011 WL 709720
at * 1 (S.D. Ga.2011). Such motions are "generally
viewed with disfavor and are often considered time
wasters." TracFone, 716 F.Supp.2d at 1290
(quotes and cite omitted). That's the case here.
Joseph's objects to Ellison's inclusion, in the
Complaint's allegations and attached exhibit, of the
EEOC's unfavorable investigatory conclusions and
references to the administrative conciliation process.
See doc. 6 at 4-5. The EEOC's determinations are
not binding on this Court. Young v. FedEx Express,
432 F.App'x 915, 917 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Moore
v. Devine, 767 F.2d 1541, 1550-51 (11th Cir. 1985));
see also doc. 6 at 5 (citing Young). But
they are potentially admissible,  and "may be significant
evidence." Id. (quotes and cite omitted).
References to those findings, therefore, are not subject to
be stricken. If St. Joseph's is concerned that the
references "will confuse the relevant issues for the
jury, " doc. 6 at 5, it will have ample opportunity to
clarify them, if not move in limine to prevent jury
taint. Finally, its argument that the publication of the
EEOC's letter is prohibited by 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(a) is similarly unavailing.
St. Joseph's Motion to Strike, doc. 6, is DENIED.
 Since Ellison removed Paragraph 42
from her Complaint, St. Joseph's motion, to the extent it
seeks to strike that paragraph, is DENIED as moot. See,
e.g., Malowney v. Fed. Collection Deposit Grp, 193 F.3d
1342, 1345 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999) ("An amended complaint
supersedes an original complaint").
 The Rule requires that parties move to
strike "before responding to the pleading."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f)(2). Since St. Joseph's filed its
motion to strike not before, but contemporaneously with, its
Answer, it is technically untimely. See,
e.g., 5C CHARLES Alan Wright, Arthur R Miller, et al.
Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1380 (3d ed. 2016) (noting
that, despite authority to the contrary, allowing
simultaneous motion to strike and answer "is both
somewhat illogical and a technical violation" of the
Rule). Despite that technicality, in the interest of
expediency, the Court nevertheless considers the merits of
St. Joseph's motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1
(Rules should be administered to secure, inter alia,
the "speedy" determination of actions).
 "In this circuit, it is well
established that EEOC determinations are generally admissible
in bench trials, " but subject to more careful scrutiny
injury trials. Walker v. Nationsbank of Fla. NA., 53
F.3d 1548, 1554 (11th Cir. 1995). The admissibility of the
determinations, assuming this case is ultimately tried by a
jury, must be made "on an individual basis, considering
the evidence's probative value and the danger of unfair
prejudice." Lathem v. Dept. of Children & Youth
Servs., 172 F.3d 786, 791 (11th Cir. 1999). This Court
cannot say, at this point, that the instant EEOC
determinations have no possible relationship to the
 St. Joseph's argues that "the
determination letter, " see doc. 1-1 at 20-21;
doc. 13-2, must be stricken because "[n]othing said or
done during and as a part of [the EEOC's informal
conciliation process] may be made public by the Commission,
its officers or employees, or used as evidence in a
subsequent proceeding without the written consent of the
persons concerned." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
Publication, in violation of the prohibition, fetches up to a
$1, 000 fine, a one-year prison sentence, or both.
Id. St. Joseph's contends the statute applies
because of the letter's invitation of the parties to
"join with [the EEOC] in reaching a just resolution of
this matter, " and statement that "[i]n this
regard, conciliation of this matter has now begun." It
also refers to an attached "conciliation agreement,
" which was not attached to the copy of the letter
Ellison filed with either version of her Complaint.
See doc. 1-1 at 20-21; doc. 13-2.
St. Joseph's argument is facially plausible, but
no more. The Supreme Court discussed this statutory section
in determining the scope of judicial review of the EEOC's
conciliation efforts. Mach Mining v. Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n, ___U.S.___, 135 S.Ct. 1645, 1655
(2015). The Court refused to sanction detailed review of the
process because it would "flout Title VII's
protection of the confidentiality of conciliation
efforts." Id. It also rejected the
Government's proposal, which would limit review to
"'bookend' letters, " including notice of
the commencement of the conciliation process. Id. at
1653. By requiring courts to engage in a review of the