United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division
FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
CATHERINE M. SALINAS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
the second civil case filed pro se by state inmate
Marcus Anthony Terrell. Terrell's first case was
dismissed without prejudice, and the Court sent Terrell the
instructions and forms necessary to file a lawsuit in the
Southern District of Georgia. See Terrell v. Municipal
Corp. of Gwinnett, No. 1:15-CV-4101-WSD (N.D.Ga.
dismissed Sept. 27, 2016) (“Terrell I”).
Terrell has nonetheless elected to refile in this Court. For
the following reasons, the undersigned (A)
RECOMMENDS that this case also be
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and (B)
DENIES all pending motions.
appears that Terrell has been incarcerated in the Georgia
state prison system since May 2013, serving a life sentence
plus a term of years for rape and other crimes. See
http://www.dcor.state.ga.us/GDC/Offender /Query (last viewed
Jan. 9, 2017; searched for GDC ID 831124); see also
 at 40 (stating Terrell is serving “3-Lifes & 50
November 2015, Terrell initiated Terrell I by filing
a two-page “Motion to Compel for Assistance and Leave
to Proceed, ” together with three pages of attachments.
See Terrell I [1 therein]. Terrell did not pay the
$400 due in case initiation fees or seek permission to
proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”).
December 2015, noting several significant deficiencies in
Terrell's filings, including that substantially all the
events about which he was complaining had occurred in the
Southern District of Georgia, the undersigned recommended
dismissal without prejudice. See Terrell I [2
therein]. The Clerk of the Court forwarded to Terrell copies
of the instructions and forms needed to refile his claims in
the Southern District of Georgia. See Id. Terrell
did not object, and this Court dismissed Terrell I
in late September 2016. See Id. [4 therein] & [5
meantime, Terrell initiated this case by filing a Civil
Rights Complaint Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and an
Affidavit in Support of Request to Proceed [IFP] in early
September 2016. See  & . In October 2016,
Terrell filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel, a document
titled “Motion Notice of Leave” seeking
permission to amend his complaint, and an Amended Complaint.
See ,  & .
December 9, 2016, the undersigned issued an Order that (1)
denied without prejudice Terrell's application for
permission to proceed IFP and ordered him to submit a
complete IFP application or to pay the $400 due in case
initiation fees within twenty-one days, (2) denied without
prejudice Terrell's motion for the appointment of
counsel, and (3) granted Terrell permission to amend his
complaint. See .
mother then filed an “Emergency Motion to Comple [sic],
” complaining that Terrell is unable to file a complete
IFP application within the twenty-one day period that this
Court's December 9, 2016 Order allowed him. See
. Terrell's mother's motion requested an extension
of time on his behalf to file a complete IFP application.
That motion is denied for the following reasons.
law provides that “[i]n all courts of the United States
the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally
or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively,
are permitted to manage the conduct causes therein.” 28
U.S.C. § 1654. Terrell's mother is not an attorney
admitted to practice law before this Court and therefore
cannot act as Terrell's “attorney.” Terrell
also filed on his own behalf a “Notice of Motion;
Motion to Compel for Extra-Time to File I.F.P.”
See . This filing acknowledges that Terrell
received the December 9, 2016 Order on December 13, 2016.
See Id. at 2. It further states that Terrell
collected and completed the documents necessary to
“compl[y] with this Court's Order, ” but
instead of mailing them to the Court, mailed them to his
mother. Terrell states that he “has no idea what has
become of his mail and documents.” Id. at 3.
noteworthy that Terrell does not state that he has attempted
(or will attempt) to obtain replacement copies of the
“lost” documents. And, as of today's date,
the docket does not reflect that Terrell's mother has
forwarded to the Court any of the documents that he sent to
her. Under these circumstances, Terrell has not demonstrated
good cause for his failure to comply with the Court's
December 9, 2016 Order, and his motion for an extension of
time to do so is denied.
event, it is evident from the face of Terrell's Amended
Complaint that he has stated no cause of action upon which
relief may be granted in this Court.
Court explained to Terrell in Terrell I, “to
the extent [Terrell] wishes to sue [Smith State] Prison
officials for actions taken in Tattnall County,
[Terrell's] suit should be filed in the Southern District
of Georgia.” Terrell I [4 therein] at 2. This
continues to apply to Terrell's repeated claims in this
case that Smith State Prison's policies and personnel
have violated his constitutional rights.
although Terrell again seeks to name the “Municipal
Corporation of Gwinnett” as a defendant in this case,
he has (as in Terrell I), stated no cognizable
federal civil rights claim against that entity. Terrell
contends in his Amended Complaint that “the Municipal
Corporation of Gwinnett [is responsible] for erecting
unconstitutional policys, which was put enforce for reasons
of discrimination, & retaliation, in a willful, corrupt,
malicious, unskillful manner, deliberate indifferent to
Petitioner's First, Sixth, Fith, & Fourteenth, &
Seventh, Amendment U.S. Constitutional Rights.”  at
5 (spelling and punctuation as in original document);
see also  at 14-16. But Terrell has
included no factual allegations in his Amended Complaint that
support this conclusory statement.
to the extent Terrell intended to incorporate by reference
his entire original Complaint in his Amended Complaint, the
original Complaint also fails to state any cognizable claims
against the ...