United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division
OPINION AND ORDER
WILLIAM S. DUFFEY, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on required frivolity review,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), of Plaintiff
Wilhy Harpo's (“Plaintiff”) Complaints filed
in civil action numbers 1:16-cv-3965-WSD (“October 24th
Action”), and 1:16-cv-4028 (“October 27th
are the latest in a series of actions filed in this Court by
Mr. Harpo in which he seeks relief from a dispossessory
action brought against him by Broadstone Maple, LLC
(“Broadstone”) in the Magistrate Court of Fulton
County, Georgia. The Court has remanded each previous case
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Order, Broadstone Maple, LLC v. Alexander Corporate
Accommodations, LLC, No. 1:16-cv-2774-WSD (N.D.Ga.
August 2, 2016) (Doc. 4). Because Plaintiff is a frequent
filer of frivolous lawsuits, the Court has previously ordered
him “to disclose his full litigation history in any
civil rights complaint and/or [IFP] affidavit that he
files.” See, e.g., Williams v. Harpo,
No. 1:16-cv-12225-WSD (N.D.Ga. 2016) (ECF No. 2 at 2);
Harpo v. City of Atlanta, No. 1:16-cv-1067-WSD
(N.D.Ga. 2016) (ECF No. 2 at 1-2); Harpo v. City of
Atlanta, No. 1:14-cv-2157-WSD (N.D.Ga. 2014) (ECF No. 2
at 1-2); Harpo v. Fulton Cty. Sheriff, No.
1:14-cv-2208-WSD (N.D.Ga. 2014) (ECF No. 2 at 1-2). It
appears Plaintiff has complied with that requirement in
filing these actions.
these actions, which contain substantially similar
allegations to one another and to Harpo's previous
filings, Defendant again seeks to challenge a dispossessory
action brought by Broadstone in the Magistrate Court of
Fulton County, Georgia. (See October 24th Action,
 at Prayer for Relief). Harpo seeks an emergency
restraining order or injunction suspending the execution of a
writ of possession issued by the Fulton County Magistrate
Court. (Id.; October 27th Action,  at 6). Harpo
also seeks an order stating that Judges Shawn LaGrua and
Judge Daniel J. Craig do not have authority to preside over
pending actions concerning Harpo. (October 27th Action, 
at 7). Harpo also asserts over a dozen claims against Judge
LaGrua, Judge Craig, the Fulton County District Attorney, the
Richmond County District Attorney, the State Bar of Georgia,
and the Governor of Georgia (together,
“Defendants”). These claims include violations of
state and federal RICO laws, false arrest, false
imprisonment, libel, slander, excessive force, conspiracy to
deny access to courts, terroristic threats, and “other
claims.” (Id. at 6). Harpo seeks $1, 000, 000
in damages, and $2, 000, 000 in damages specifically from
Judge Craig. (Id.; October 24th Action,  at 8).
must dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if
at any time the court determines the action is frivolous or
malicious or that it fails to state a claim on which relief
can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).
“Failure to state a claim under §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard as
dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6).” Wilkerson v. H&S, Inc., 366 F.
App'x 49, 51 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Mitchell v.
Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997)). Under
this standard, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
for frivolousness, on the other hand, “‘accords
judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual
power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual
allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual
contentions are clearly baseless.'” Miller v.
Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). A
claim is frivolous when it “has little or no chance of
success, ” that is, when it appears “from the
face of the complaint that the factual allegations are
‘clearly baseless' or that the legal theories are
‘indisputably meritless.'” Carroll v.
Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327).
filed his Complaints pro se. “A document filed
pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro
se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held
to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Nevertheless, a pro se plaintiff must comply with
the threshold requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Beckwith v. Bellsouth Telecomms.
Inc., 146 F. App'x 368, 371 (11th Cir. 2005).
“Even though a pro se complaint should be
construed liberally, a pro se complaint still must
state a claim upon which the Court can grant relief.”
Grigsby v. Thomas, 506 F.Supp.2d 26, 28 (D.D.C.
2007). “[A] district court does not have license to
rewrite a deficient pleading.” Osahar v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 297 F. App'x 863, 864 (11th Cir.
complaints attempt to challenge a state-court dispossessory
action. To the extent Harpo seeks to remove the state-court
action, as explained in the Court's previous orders, the
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over it. The Court
takes judicial notice of Broadstone's complaint, which
Harpo previously provided the Court in Broadstone Maple
v. Harpo, No. 1:16-cv-1661. The complaint shows that
Broadstone asserts a dispossessory claim and does not allege
federal law claims. That Harpo asserts defenses or
counterclaims based on federal law cannot confer federal
subject-matter jurisdiction over this action. See
Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6
(2003); Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation
Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830-32 (2002). Removal is not
proper based on federal question jurisdiction. The Court would
also lack diversity jurisdiction over any attempted removal,
because Broadstone's complaint, which only seeks
ejectment and past due rent and fees, does not establish that
the amount-in-controversy exceeds $75, 000. See Novastar
Mortg. Inc. v. Bennett, 173 F.Supp.2d 1358, 1361
(N.D.Ga. 2001), aff'd, 35 F. App'x 585 (11th
Cir. 2002) (a court must look to the complaint to determine
the amount-in-controversy, and a claim seeking ejectment
cannot be reduced to a monetary sum for purposes of
determining amount-in-controversy); Fed. Home Loan Mortg.
Corp. v. Williams, Nos. 1:07-cv-2864-RWS,
1:07-cv-2865-RWS, 2008 WL 115096, at *2 (N.D.Ga. Jan. 29,
2008) (“[A] dispossessory proceeding under Georgia law
is not an ownership dispute, but rather only a dispute over
the limited right to possession, title to property is not at
issue and, accordingly, the removing Defendant may not rely
on the value of the property as a whole to satisfy the amount
in controversy requirement.”).
extent the dispossessory action has been completed and Harpo
seeks to have the Court find that the proceeding was wrongful
and overturn a writ of possession issued by a state court,
the Court lacks jurisdiction under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine to do so. Doe v. Fla.
Bar, 630 F.3d 1336, 1341 (11th Cir. 2011) (Federal
district courts “generally lack jurisdiction to review
a final state court decision.”) (citing D.C. Court
of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) &
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923)).
Harpo's claims against Judges LaGrua and Craig are
clearly baseless. Harpo claims Judges Craig and LaGrue
“committed perjury, ” when they secured
“wrongful conviction[s]” to prevent Harpo from
suing the Richmond County and Fulton County governments for
racial discrimination. He claims the judges thereafter
refused to recuse themselves from cases they presided over in
which Harpo was a party. “Judges are entitled to
absolute judicial immunity from damages for those acts taken
while they are acting in their judicial capacity unless they
acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”
Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir.