United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division
WILHY HARPO, et al. Plaintiff,
LESLIE ONNA, and All Other Occupants, and WILHY HARPO, Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
WILLIAM S. DUFFEY, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on required frivolity review of
Plaintiff Wilhy Harpo's (“Plaintiff”)
Complaint [1.1] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
the latest in a series of actions filed in this Court by Mr.
Harpo in which he seeks relief from a dispossessory action
brought against him by Broadstone Maple, LLC
(“Broadstone”) in the Magistrate Court of Fulton
County, Georgia. The Court has remanded each previous case
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Order, Broadstone Maple, LLC v. Alexander Corporate
Accommodations, LLC, No. 1:16-cv-2774-WSD (N.D.Ga.
August 2, 2016) (Doc. 4). Because Plaintiff is a frequent
filer of frivolous lawsuits, the Court has previously ordered
him “to disclose his full litigation history in any
civil rights complaint and/or [IFP] affidavit that he
files.” See, e.g., Williams v. Harpo,
No. 1:16-cv-12225-WSD (N.D.Ga. 2016) (ECF No. 2 at 2);
Harpo v. City of Atlanta, No. 1:16-cv-1067-WSD
(N.D.Ga. 2016) (ECF No. 2 at 1-2); Harpo v. City of
Atlanta, No. 1:14-cv-2157-WSD (N.D.Ga. 2014) (ECF No. 2
at 1-2); Harpo v. Fulton Cty. Sheriff, No.
1:14-cv-2208-WSD (N.D.Ga. 2014) (ECF No. 2 at 1-2). It
appears Plaintiff has complied with that requirement in
filing this action. (See [1.2] at 8-9 (listing 18
actions in which Mr. Harpo was a party)).
August 12, 2016, Defendant Wilhy Harpo
(“Defendant”) filed his application for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) 
and his Complaint [1.1]. Defendant again seeks to challenge a
dispossessory action brought by Broadstone in the Magistrate
Court of Fulton County, Georgia (See Compl. at
Prayer for Relief). The Complaint also contains a number of
highly troublesome threats of violence. For instance,
Plaintiff states that he “will simply kill [his] known
enemies or be killed[, ]” and that he “will get
the respect [he] gives and deserves to receive by consent or
force[.]” (Compl. ¶¶ 112, 114). He states
that his “Complaint is designed, in part, to serve as
public notice of official public abuse and Harpo's
warning to the said defendant public officials.”
(Id. ¶ 115). He further states “we will
all soon see if an how much both black and blue lives
really matter.” (Id. ¶ 116).
must dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if
at any time the court determines the action is frivolous or
malicious or that it fails to state a claim on which relief
can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).
“Failure to state a claim under §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard as
dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6).” Wilkerson v. H&S, Inc., 366 F.
App'x 49, 51 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Mitchell v.
Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997)). Under
this standard, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
for frivolousness, on the other hand, “‘accords
judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual
power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual
allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual
contentions are clearly baseless.'” Miller v.
Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). A
claim is frivolous when it “has little or no chance of
success, ” that is, when it appears “from the
face of the complaint that the factual allegations are
‘clearly baseless' or that the legal theories are
‘indisputably meritless.'” Carroll v.
Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327).
filed his Complaint pro se. “A document filed
pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro
se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held
to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Nevertheless, a pro se plaintiff must comply with
the threshold requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Beckwith v. Bellsouth Telecomms.
Inc., 146 F. App'x 368, 371 (11th Cir. 2005).
“Even though a pro se complaint should be
construed liberally, a pro se complaint still must
state a claim upon which the Court can grant relief.”
Grigsby v. Thomas, 506 F.Supp.2d 26, 28 (D.D.C.
2007). “[A] district court does not have license to
rewrite a deficient pleading.” Osahar v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 297 F. App'x 863, 864 (11th Cir.
Complaint attempts to challenge a state-court dispossessory
action. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to remove the
state-court action, as explained in the Court's previous
orders, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over it.
The Court takes judicial notice of Broadstone's
complaint, which Plaintiff previously provided the Court in
Broadstone Maple v. Harpo, No. 1:16-cv-1661. The
complaint shows that Broadstone asserts a dispossessory claim
and does not allege federal law claims. That Defendant
asserts defenses or counterclaims based on federal law cannot
confer federal subject-matter jurisdiction over this action.
See Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S.
1, 6 (2003); Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air
Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830-32 (2002).
Removal is not proper based on federal question
jurisdiction. The Court would also lack diversity action
over any attempted removal, because Broadstone's
complaint, which only seeks ejectment and past due rent and
fees, does not establish that the amount-in-controversy
exceeds $75, 000. See Novastar Mortg. Inc. v.
Bennett, 173 F.Supp.2d 1358, 1361 (N.D.Ga. 2001),
aff'd, 35 F. App'x 585 (11th Cir. 2002) (a
court must look to the complaint to determine the
amount-in-controversy, and a claim seeking ejectment cannot
be reduced to a monetary sum for purposes of determining
amount-in-controversy); Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v.
Williams, Nos. 1:07-cv-2864-RWS, 1:07-cv-2865-RWS, 2008
WL 115096, at *2 (N.D.Ga. Jan. 29, 2008) (“[A]
dispossessory proceeding under Georgia law is not an
ownership dispute, but rather only a dispute over the limited
right to possession, title to property is not at issue and,
accordingly, the removing Defendant may not rely on the value
of the property as a whole to satisfy the amount in
extent the dispossessory action has been completed and
Plaintiff seeks to have the Court find that the proceeding
was wrongful and overturn a writ of possession issued by a
state court, the Court lacks jurisdiction under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine to do so. Doe v. Fla.
Bar, 630 F.3d 1336, 1341 (11th Cir. 2011) (Federal
district courts “generally lack jurisdiction to review
a final state court decision.”) (citing D.C. Court
of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) &
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923)).
Court finds Plaintiffs claims are clearly baseless, and this
action is dismissed pursuant to the required frivolity review
under 28 U.S.C. ...