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Khan v. Corbat

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division

July 20, 2015

MUSTAFA SHAKUR KHAN EL, Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL L. CORBAT, et al., Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

WILLIAM S. DUFFEY, Jr. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Mustafa Shakur Khan El's ("Plaintiff) Objections [8] to Magistrate Judge Gerrilyn G. Brill's Final Report and Recommendation ("R&R") [5], which recommends that this action be closed.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 30, 2014, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP Application") [1, 1.1].[1] Plaintiff does not provide any information in his IFP Apphcation regarding his assets, income, or expenses, and instead asserts that he "do[es] not have, or possess, any gold or silver coins, as prescribed by the United States Constitution Law, which is the lawful money to pay the restricting demands, conditionally commanded by Employees and Contractors of the Court.” (See [1.1] at 2). Plaintiff’s IFP Application and Complaint are nonsensical, convoluted and conclusory. In his Complaint, Plaintiff appears to assert various claims against Defendants Michael L. Corbat, the C.E.O. of CitiGroup, Jane Fraser, C.E.O. of CitiMortgage, CitiMortgage, Inc. and Citibank (collectively, “Defendants”) for breach of contract, fraud, violation of the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), and his constitutional rights.

On October 7, 2014, Magistrate Judge Brill denied Plaintiff’s IFP Application and directed Plaintiff to submit either the standard filing fee of $350, or a completed financial affidavit containing “information showing that he is unable to do so.” (October 7th Order [2] at 2).

Plaintiff did not submit the required filing fee or a completed financial affidavit. Rather, Plaintiff filed a series of “affidavits, ” in which he appears to argue that the filing-fee requirement is unconstitutional and generally reiterates his claims against Defendants. (See, e.g., [3] at 3-4).[2]

On October 16, 2014, Magistrate Judge Brill issued her R&R. Having found that Plaintiff failed to pay the filing fee and has not shown that is unable to pay the filing fee, Magistrate Judge Brill recommended that this action be closed.

On October 20, 2014, Plaintiff filed his Objections to the R&R.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

After conducting a careful and complete review of the findings and recommendations, a district judge may accept, reject, or modify a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Williams v. Wainwright, 681 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1112 (1983). A district judge “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). With respect to those findings and recommendations to which objections have not been asserted, the Court must conduct a plain error review of the record. United States v. Slay, 714 F.2d 1093, 1095 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1050 (1984).

B. Analysis

Plaintiff’s Objections, like the rest of his filings, are illogical and mostly unrelated to Magistrate Judge Brill’s October 7th Order or the R&R. To the extent Plaintiff argues that the Court lacks authority to require him to pay the filing fee or file a completed IFP Application, it is well-settled that “[t]he right of access to the courts is neither absolute nor unconditional, ” and “conditions and restrictions on each person’s access are necessary to preserve the judicial resource for all persons.” Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1096 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit have recognized that “filing fees in theory discourage frivolous law suits and thus help allocate judicial resources to more meritorious cases.” Id. (citing In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989)).

Here, Magistrate Judge Brill simply directed Plaintiff to either pay the filing fee or submit an affidavit showing that he is unable to do so. Plaintiff did neither. Local Rule 41.3 authorizes the Court to dismiss an action for want of prosecution if, after notice, a plaintiff fails or refuses to obey a lawful order of the court. LR 41.3, NDGa. Magistrate Judge Brill’s October 7th Order and the R&R put Plaintiff on notice that he was required to pay the filing fee or submit a completed financial ...


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