United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Gainesville Division
CHRISTY M. KENT, Plaintiff,
WAGNER SERVICE SOLUTIONS, INC. and ASHLEY THOMPSON, Defendants.
RICHARD W. STORY, District Judge.
This case comes before the Court on Defendant Wagner Service Solutions' Motion to Dismiss . After reviewing the record, the Court enters the following Order.
Plaintiff Christy M. Kent ("Plaintiff") filed a Complaint alleging that Defendant Wagner Service Solutions, Inc. violated the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., by denying Plaintiff overtime compensation and retaliating against her when she requested due but unpaid compensation. (Compl., Dkt. , ¶¶ 1-2.)
Plaintiff has been employed by Defendant Wagner Service Solutions, Inc. ("Defendant") since June 10, 2013. (Id. ¶ 6.) In addition to Defendant, Plaintiff names Ashley Thompson, one of her supervisors, as a defendant in her Complaint. Plaintiff alleges that her work for Defendant is non-exempt under the FLSA, meaning that it is eligible for overtime compensation. (Id. ¶ ¶ 23-40.) Plaintiff alleges that when she was hired, her supervisors instructed her to record no more than forty hours per week on her time sheets. (Id. ¶ 46.) Her supervisors said they would privately track Plaintiff's overtime work and compensate her with time off. (Id. ¶¶ 47-48.) Plaintiff alleges from June 10, 2013 to the present, Defendant has never paid Plaintiff overtime compensation. (Id. ¶ 53.)
On November 12, 2013, Plaintiff requested that Defendant compensate her for overtime work. (Id. ¶ 61.) Upon her request, Plaintiff's supervisors reviewed security camera records and found that Plaintiff had worked more than thirty-nine hours overtime, for which she had not been compensated. (Id. ¶¶ 65-66.) Plaintiff alleges that her supervisors agreed to give Plaintiff overtime compensation on the condition that Plaintiff sign a document stating that she had falsified her time sheets. (Id. ¶¶ 73-74.) Plaintiff refused to sign the document. (Id. ¶ 77.) After the meeting, Defendant took disciplinary action against Plaintiff, demanded that she surrender her office keys and company cell phone, and suspended her indefinitely without pay. (Id. ¶ 94.)
Defendant now moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint on the grounds that it fails to state a claim.
I. Legal Standard
When considering a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a federal court is to accept as true "all facts set forth in the plaintiff's complaint." Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Further, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1273 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) (internal citations omitted). However, "[a] pleading that offers labels and conclusions' or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertion[s]' devoid of further factual enhancement.'" Id.
The United States Supreme Court has dispensed with the rule that a complaint may only be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) when "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). The Supreme Court has replaced that rule with the "plausibility standard, " which requires that factual allegations "raise the right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 556. The plausibility standard "does not[, however, ] impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence [supporting the claim]." Id.
In its Motion to Dismiss, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's Complaint fails to meet the pleading standard set out in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal . (Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss Compl. ("Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss"), Dkt.  at 3-5.) Defendant also argues that Plaintiff's Complaint neither sufficiently alleges nor factually substantiates the elements of an FLSA claim for inadequate compensation. (Id. at 5.) Specifically, Defendant argues that the Complaint does not contain sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of Plaintiff's uncompensated overtime work. (Id. at 6.)
Defendant acknowledges a split of authority regarding the FLSA pleading standard, and relies on Dyer v. Lara's Trucks, Inc. and Rance v. Rocksolid Granit USA, Inc. as persuasive authority to support the merits of its Motion to Dismiss. (Def.'s Reply to Pl.'s Resp. to Def's Mot. to Dismiss ("Def.'s Reply"), Dkt. , 6-8.) In Dyer v. Lara's Trucks, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit concluded that a motion to dismiss is an appropriate vehicle for testing the sufficiency of the factual allegations supporting an FLSA collective action. 2013 WL 609307 at *4 (N.D.Ga. Feb. 19, 2013). But Dyer does not apply to the present case because Plaintiff has not brought a ...