HOUSE HASSON HARDWARE COMPANY, INC.
LAWSON'S HOME CENTER, INC. et al
Guaranty. Cherokee Superior Court. Before Judge Harris.
Sponcler & Tharpe, Henry C. Tharpe, Jr., Rebecca B. Gober, for appellant.
Bray & Johnson, H. Michael Bray, Jennifer S. Gill, for appellees.
House Hasson Hardware Company, Inc. (" House Hasson" ) sued Lawson's Home Center, Inc. (" LHC" ) and its principals, Richard Lawson and Scott Lawson, alleging that LHC defaulted on a promissory note and that the Lawsons were personally liable for that note based on a written guaranty. After the parties filed cross-motions for [332 Ga.App. 296] summary judgment, the trial court granted House Hasson's motion on its claim that LHC was liable for the debt but denied it as to the Lawsons, and granted the Lawsons' motion on the ground that the personal guaranty did not satisfy the Statute of Frauds. House Hasson appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that the personal guaranty was unenforceable.
In an unpublished opinion issued on February 26, 2014, this Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that our prior precedents in this area of law--including Thompson v. LaFarge Building Materials, Inc. --" dictate[d] the result in this case" --i.e., our conclusion that the personal guaranty did not identify the principal debtor with sufficient specificity to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. But on October 20, 2014, the Supreme Court of Georgia granted House Hasson's petition for certiorari, vacated our judgment, and remanded the case to this Court for reconsideration in light of its recent decision in LaFarge Building Materials, Inc. v. Thompson. In that decision, the Supreme Court held that a personal guaranty, which incorporated the subject credit application and described the party whose debt was guaranteed as the " applicant," sufficiently identified the principal debtor to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. And given this decision, we conclude that the personal guaranty at issue here likewise sufficiently identified the principal debtor. Thus, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Lawsons as to the enforceability of the personal guaranty and its denial of summary judgment to House Hasson as to this same issue.
At the outset of our analysis, we note that summary judgment is proper " if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."  If summary judgment is granted by a trial court, it enjoys no presumption of correctness on [332 Ga.App. 297] appeal, " and an appellate court must satisfy itself de novo that the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) have been met."  Indeed, in our de novo review of a trial court's grant of a motion for summary judgment, we are charged with " viewing the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant." 
So viewed, the record shows that on October 18, 1996, LHC completed a credit application with House Hasson. At the top of the form, a line designated for the " Individual, Partners, or Corporate Name" was left blank, but just below, a line designated for the " Trade Name or Business Name" indicated " Lawson's Home Center, Inc." The bottom of the form contains a paragraph that reads as follows:
The undersigned, jointly and individually, guarantee any and all debts, direct or indirect, contingent or otherwise, whether now existing or hereafter incurred, of the above Applicant to House Hasson Hardware (HHH). This guaranty will continue in full force and effect until revocation in writing by the undersigned. Such revocation shall not release the undersigned from any liability owed prior to receipt by HHH of such revocation notice. The undersigned expressly waives notice of acceptance of the guaranty, diligence, presentment, demand for payment, any right to require proceedings first against Applicant, protest or notices of any kind.
Below this paragraph, Scott Lawson and Richard Lawson signed on lines above their
printed names, which were designated for ...