Revocation of probation. Fayette Superior Court. Before Judge Sams.
Mignott Law Group, Marsha W. Mignott, for appellant.
Scott L. Ballard, District Attorney, Robert W. Smith, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
MCFADDEN, Judge. Andrews, P. J., and Ray, J., concur.
We granted discretionary review of the trial court's order revoking Terrell Haji's probation. Haji argues that the revocation order should be reversed because the order did not state the basis for the revocation, the trial court based the revocation on a ground not [331 Ga.App. 117] alleged in the revocation petition, and the evidence did not authorize revocation. The record makes clear, however, that the trial court based the revocation on his finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that while on probation Haji committed the offense of cruelty to children, a ground alleged in the revocation petition. Because the evidence supported that finding, we find no error and affirm.
1. Facts and procedural history.
In 2007, Haji pleaded guilty to several counts of operating a chop shop and theft by receiving, and he received a probated ten-year sentence. One of the terms of his probation was that he not violate any criminal laws. On August 27, 2013, the state petitioned the trial court to revoke Haji's probation, alleging that he had committed several criminal offenses, including cruelty to children.
After a hearing on the revocation petition at which the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Haji had committed the offense of cruelty to children, the trial court entered an order revoking Haji's probation and requiring him to serve two years in confinement. Haji obtained discretionary appellate review of this ruling.
2. Basis for revocation.
Haji argues that the trial court did not state in his written order the basis for the revocation. See generally State v. Brinson, 248 Ga. 380, 380-381 (1) (283 S.E.2d 463) (1981) (discussing requirement that factfinder provide a written statement of reasons for revoking probation). He also argues that the trial court revoked his probation for a reason not alleged in the revocation petition. See Dillard v. State, 319 Ga.App. 299, 300 (735 S.E.2d 297) (2012) (judgment based upon offense not charged in petition for revocation must be reversed); Sosbee v. State, 155 Ga.App. 196, 197 (270 S.E.2d 367) (1980) (same). Neither argument has merit.
The trial court did not specify the basis for revocation in his written order. But " [w]e are not constrained to read the revocation order in isolation. 'From the record, both the defendant and the appellate court can ascertain the basis for revocation of the defendant's probation.' " Henderson v. State, 167 Ga.App. 808, 809 (1) (307 S.E.2d 704) (1983) (quoting Brinson, supra, 148 Ga. at 381 (1)). At the revocation hearing, the trial court expressly found that Haji was in violation of his probation because he committed the offense of cruelty to children, which was one of the grounds for revocation alleged in the petition. The transcript of this hearing is sufficient ...