Foreclosure. Douglas Superior Court. Before Judge Emerson.
Schreeder, Wheeler & Flint, John A. Christy, Kelly L. Walsh, for appellant.
Stites & Harbison, Melinda Agee, for appellee.
ELLINGTON, Presiding Judge. Phipps, C. J., and McMillian, J., concur.
Ellington, Presiding Judge.
Community & Southern Bank auctioned David Sanusi's property at foreclosure and then initiated confirmation proceedings. After a hearing, the Superior Court of Douglas County determined that the bank failed to prove that the property brought its true market value at the foreclosure sale and denied the bank's application for confirmation. In a subsequent order, the court granted the bank's motion for permission to resell the property. Sanusi appeals, contending that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the bank's motion to resell the property and that the trial court abused its discretion in finding " good cause" for a resale of the property. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.
1. Sanusi contends that the issue of resale is always before the court in a confirmation proceeding. He contends that the trial court's order denying the bank's application for confirmation of the foreclosure, which was entered on September 3, 2013, was a final order and that " the trial court had no authority to continue to issue rulings after a final order had been entered which concluded the proceedings." He contends that the bank's separate motion for resale, filed September 17, 2013, was " untimely."
By arguing that the issue of resale is always before the court in a confirmation proceeding and that the September 3, 2013 order was a final order that disposed of all matters that were before the trial court, Sanusi implicitly posits that, although the September 3, 2013 order was silent on the issue of whether the bank had shown good cause for a resale, the order effectively prohibited any resale. In that [330 Ga.App. 199] case, the bank's motion for resale must be construed as a motion to modify that " final order" so as to permit a resale. It is well settled that
[a] trial judge has the inherent power during the same term of court in which the judgment was rendered to revise, correct,
revoke, modify or vacate the judgment, even upon his own motion. Moreover, this inherent power may be extended beyond the term in which a judgment was entered when a motion [to modify, revoke, or vacate the judgment] is filed within that same term of court.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Todd v. Todd, 287 Ga. 250, 253 (2) (703 S.E.2d 597) (2010). Because the bank filed its motion within the term of court that the order denying confirmation was entered, the trial court was authorized to exercise its inherent power to ...