In the Interest of R. M., a child
Delinquency. Greene Juvenile Court. Before Judge Spivey.
Alice A. Button, for appellant.
Fredric D. Bright, District Attorney, Joseph M. McKinnon, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
BARNES, Presiding Judge. Boggs and Branch, JJ., concur.
Barnes, Presiding Judge.
The juvenile court revoked R. M.'s probation and committed him to the Georgia Department of Juvenile Justice for 60 months, at least 18 of which were to be served in confinement at a youth detention [329 Ga.App. 726] center. On appeal, R. M. contends that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to revoke his probation because the State did not file a proper revocation petition, that his due process rights were violated because of the State's failure to file and serve him with a sufficient petition, and that the evidence was
insufficient to establish that he violated his probation. Upon our review, we affirm.
The enumerations related to the revocation of probation involve questions of law, which we review de novo, and " [w]e review the factual findings supporting the juvenile court's order for clear error." In the Interest of R. F., 295 Ga.App. 739 (673 S.E.2d 108) (2009).
The record shows that on February 1, 2012, R. M. was adjudicated delinquent for having committed an offense that would have constituted aggravated child molestation if he had been an adult. On March 7, 2012, the juvenile court placed R. M. on 20 months of probation, the conditions of which included that he not violate any laws or use drugs, among other things.
At some point in 2013, the State filed a petition to adjudicate R. M. delinquent for theft by taking a motor vehicle, failure to report an accident, and driving without a license, and at an August 28, 2013 hearing, he was adjudicated delinquent. At that hearing, the State apparently filed a motion to revoke R. M.'s probation on the earlier child molestation adjudication, alleging numerous probation violations, including the adjudication for the traffic offenses and car theft and served a copy on R. M.'s attorney. Disposition on the automobile-related offenses was deferred until September 4, 2013, when the juvenile court also considered the probation revocation petition.
At the September 4, 2013, hearing, R. M. argued that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the State's petition to revoke his probation. According to R. M., when the State files a petition to revoke probation, the petition must contain the same contents as a delinquency petition as set forth in former OCGA § 15-11-38.1 and Uniform Juvenile Court Rule 3.8, and the State must follow the same ...