United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division
OPINION AND ORDER
WILLIAM S. DUFFEY, Jr., District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Magistrate Judge J. Clay Fuller's Report and Recommendation ("R&R")  which recommends remanding this dispossessory action to the Magistrate Court of Gwinnett County, Georgia. Also before the Court are Barbara Duroser's ("Movant") Objections  to the R&R, and Citibank, N.A.'s ("Plaintiff") Motion to Remand .
On May 20, 2014, Plaintiff filed in the Magistrate Court of Gwinnett County, Georgia, a dispossessory proceeding ("Complaint") [2 at 7] against Eric D. Johnson and all others ("Defendants"). The Complaint seeks possession of real property currently held by Defendants following a foreclosure sale of the property.
On June 9, 2014, Movant, proceeding pro se, removed the Gwinnett County Action to this Court by filing her Notice of Removal and an application to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP"). Movant claims in her Notice of Removal that Plaintiff violated the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") and various federal laws, including the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. ("FDCPA"), the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. ("TILA"), and the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5220 et seq. ("PTFA").
On June 12, 2014, Magistrate Judge Fuller granted Movant's IFP application and considered sua sponte the question of subject matter jurisdiction. Judge Fuller found that Movant fails to show that the amount in controversy exceeds $75, 000, and he concluded that the Court does not have diversity jurisdiction over this matter. Judge Fuller also found that Plaintiff's Complaint is a dispossessory action, which Movant contends violates federal law. Noting that a federal law defense or counterclaim alone is not sufficient to confer federal jurisdiction, Judge Fuller concluded that the Court does not have federal question jurisdiction over this matter. Judge Fuller concluded that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action and that it is required to be remanded to state court.
On July 1, 2014, Movant filed her Objections to the R&R, in which she reasserts generally that the Court has diversity and federal question jurisdiction over this action and that the R&R violates certain provisions of the United States Constitution.
On July 22, 2014, Plaintiff filed its Motion to Remand.
A. Legal Standard
After conducting a careful and complete review of the findings and recommendations, a district judge may accept, reject, or modify a magistrate judge's report and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Williams v. Wainwright , 681 F.2d 732, 732 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). A district judge "shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). With respect to those findings and recommendations to which a party has not asserted objections, the Court must conduct a plain error review of the record. United States v. Slay , 714 F.2d 1093, 1095 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
Movant has filed objections to the R&R and the Court thus conducts a de novo review of the record.
Movant appears to object to the finding in the R&R that the Court does not have federal question jurisdiction over this action. "The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the well-pleaded complaint rule, ' which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams , 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Thus, a federal cause of action within a ...