United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Albany Division
W. LOUIS SANDS, District Judge.
Presently pending before the Court is Defendant City of Albany's Motion to Strike (Doc. 44) and Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 28.) For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion to Strike is DENIED and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
Plaintiff Martha Faye Everson filed her complaint in the above-captioned matter on June 22, 2012, asserting claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts (hereinafter "Title VII"), as amended at 42 U.S.C. §2000(e), et seq., for race discrimination and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, et seq., for age discrimination. Plaintiff contends she was discharged from her position as Human Resources ("HR") Administrator on March 11, 2010, due to her race and age. (Doc. 1, at ¶ 8.) On August 11, 2012, Defendant answered Plaintiff's complaint. (Doc. 6.)
On October 7, 2013, Defendant moved for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 28.) According to Defendant, Plaintiffs discharge was a result of falsifying her employment application, a non-discriminatory reason. (Doc. 30.) On November 25, 2013, Plaintiff filed her Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 38.) On the same day Plaintiff filed her Response, she also attached several affidavits and depositions, including that of the Director of HR when she was hired, Mary Lamont ("Lamont"). (Docs. 40-2, 40-13.)
On December 20, 2013, Defendant filed its Reply to Plaintiff's Response. (Doc. 43.) Along with its Response, Defendant filed a Motion to Strike the Deposition of Mary Lamont. (Doc. 44.) Defendant argues several statements made by Lamont during her deposition fail to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 and Fed.R.Evid. 602. Plaintiff did not file a response to Defendant's Motion to Strike.
I. Defendant's Motion to Strike
Defendant moves to strike Lamont's deposition, specifying particular statements allegedly not in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 and Fed.R.Evid. 602. (Doc. 44.) The Court did not rely upon the specified statements noted by Defendant in Lamont's deposition (Doc. 40-13) in its analysis of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Therefore, Plaintiff's Motion to Strike is DENIED as MOOT.
II. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
A. Summary Judgment Standard
a. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56
"Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Chow v. Chak Yam Chau, No. 12-15994, 2014 WL 92094, *3 (11th Cir. Jan. 10, 2014) (citing Maddox v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 1109, 1118 (11th Cir. 2013)). "A genuine issue of material fact does not exist unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its favor." Grimes v. Miami Dade Cnty., 552 F.Appx. 902, 904 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000)). "An issue of fact is material' if it is a legal element of the claim under the applicable substantive law which might affect the outcome of the case." Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). "It is genuine' if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 998 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
The movant bears the initial burden of showing, by reference to the record, that there is no genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Barreto v. Davie Marketplace, LLC, 331 F.Appx. 672, 673 (11th Cir. 2009). The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact, or by demonstrating to the district court that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24. Once the movant has met its burden, the nonmoving party is required "to go beyond the pleadings" and identify "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 324. To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must do more than summarily deny the allegations or show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.'" Matsuhita, 475 U.S. at 586 (citations omitted). Instead, the nonmovant must point to record evidence that would be admissible at trial. See Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1294 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Macuba v. Deboer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 1999)) ...