Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. (No. 94-6294-CIV-WDF). Wilkie D. Ferguson, Jr., Judge.
Before Tjoflat, Chief Judge, and Dubina and Black, Circuit Judges.
We affirm the judgment of the district court for the reasons stated in the court's dispositive order, attached hereto as an Appendix.
THIS CAUSE came before the Court for hearing on December 14, 1994 on Defendant Broward County's Motion for Summary Judgment (DE # 13). After full consideration of the undisputed facts, memoranda of law, affidavits, and argument of counsel, it is found as follows:
On approximately February 15, 1994, Loretta Morisky submitted a form application for the position of Custodian I with the Defendant Broward County. The job announcement for the custodial position provided that a written test was required in the application process. On the face of the form, applicants were advised to notify the staff if testing assistance was needed due to a disability. On the education section of the application, Morisky indicated that she had not received the requisite high school diploma. Her application was considered nonetheless because she indicated that she had completed special education courses.*fn1
On the scheduled test date, Morisky arrived at the testing center accompanied by Robert Magaz, a vocational rehabilitation counselor. Magaz informed the test proctor that Morisky was illiterate and was suffering from bronchial asthma. Although Morisky had not previously requested an accommodation, Magaz requested that he, or an employee of Broward County, be allowed to read the test to Morisky. Morisky made a similar request. Both the proctor and her supervisor refused to allow Morisky to have the test read to her based upon their belief that an ability to read was a requirement of the Custodian I position. At no time did Morisky or Magaz inform anyone employed by Broward County that Morisky had a mental or developmental disability. Instead, Morisky elected not to take the test.
On April 6, 1994, Morisky filed the instant complaint against Defendant Broward County, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant failed to provide a reasonable accommodation for her disability when it refused to allow her to take an oral examination in lieu of a written test for the position of Custodian I. Defendant Broward County argues that plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case under the ADA.
STANDARD ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate:
after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the party's case, and on which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). Additionally, the Celotex Court stated that: "Rule 56(e) therefore requires that the nonmoving party go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the "depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate "specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.' " Id. at 324, 106 S. Ct. at 2553. The standard for summary judgment is the same as that for a directed verdict, which "the trial judge must grant if, under governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 4 ...